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Abstract
This study consists of an analysis of Egyptian foreign policy during the Saite 
period (including the reign of Necho I), and also briefly examines the actions of the 
Twenty-fifth Dynasty in order to establish the correct context. Despite the large gaps 
in the historical record during this period, judicious use of sources from a number of 
different cultures allows the historian to attempt to reconstruct the actions of the time, 
and to discuss possible motivations for them, seeking to identify concerns linking the 
foreign policy of all the Saite kings.
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Introduction
The motivations behind the actions of those in power can be extremely 
difficult to ascertain, and this is possibly why although the Late Period has 
increasingly become the focus of many scholars' interest and ensuing publication, we 
could still be said to be lacking a recent comprehensive treatment which seeks to 
bring together evidence from as many sources as possible to analyse the foreign 
relations of the Saite period.
As the term 'Saite period' will be used constantly throughout this thesis, it 
seems natural to define it before we go any further. The Saite period, referring to the 
time when Egypt was ruled by the Twenty-sixth Dynasty, is slightly more difficult to 
define than would first appear. It is most commonly thought of as beginning in 656 
B.C., when the reign of Psammetichus I over the whole of Egypt began, and ending in 
525 B.C. with the Persian invasion of Egypt. If the end point is indisputable, the start 
is not, and I am including Necho I in this analysis since not only has Perdu's work 
suggested that he was more powerful than has previously been believed, 1 but, more 
pertinently for our purposes, the actions of his reign dealt with the foreign threat to 
Egypt.
Just like 'Saite period', so 'foreign relations' is a term that will be used again 
and again, and therefore it would seem to be an appropriate time to define it also, 
especially since it initially seems somewhat nebulous. Foreign relations can occur on 
several different levels of society; at the highest level we have contact through gift 
exchange and what would now be termed diplomacy, while lower down the social 
scale trade might be a factor, although the presence of royal monopolies on certain
Perdu 2002b
items must not be forgotten, whereas military matters would largely be a concern of 
the elites, although not all the troops would have been drawn from this level of society 
by any means. Although all of these factors could be said to be part of the political 
armoury of a country, our main focus will be on the more specific interpretation of 
political contact - generally concerned with the higher echelons of society, although it 
is important to remember that what happens at ground level can affect attitudes higher 
up the social scale.
The aim of this study is to determine what motives there were behind the 
actions of the rulers of the Twenty-sixth Dynasty in connection with other nations and 
peoples. Naturally, over what is a relatively lengthy period of time, it is only to be 
expected that there would be different pressures, factors and catalysts influencing 
decisions, although it is possible that some themes, such as the need to secure Egypt's 
defence, will be seen to have been present in political thinking throughout the period.
As such, it seems best to treat the actions of the kings of this dynasty in a 
relatively strict chronological manner. Consequently, in the first chapter I will 
initially examine the actions of the Twenty-fifth Dynasty, the Kushite kings who 
preceded the Saite period, in order to establish context for later actions, as well as the 
intrigue involving Necho I and the Assyrians. With the context established, the early 
actions of Psammetichus I will be examined. Although it is at first tempting to look at 
the startlingly long reign (664-610 B.C.) of this king as one entity, the reality is that 
we have essentially no evidence for the majority of the middle section of his reign. It 
would seem foolish, then, to attempt to treat the two quite separate periods of time we 
are presented with as one.
Chapter two will include a discussion of possible reasons for this lack of 
evidence, as well as an examination of the latter period of the reign of Psammetichus
I. The reigns of his successors Necho II (610-595 B.C.) and Psammetichus II (595- 
589 B.C.) will also be analysed, paying particular attention to their actions in Western 
Asia and Nubia, and how they built upon the foundations set down by Psammetichus 
I. The reigns of Apries (589-570 B.C.), Amasis (570-526 B.C.), and Psammetichus 
HI (526-525 B.C.) will be dealt with in the third chapter, focusing on the increasingly 
important role of the Aegean in the Egyptian world view (and vice versa), before in 
the conclusion I pick out any trends that can be spotted throughout these three time 
spans.
As suggested earlier, one of the reasons why foreign relations of this period 
cannot be said to have been over-analysed by scholars is because little evidence 
survives, particularly in Egypt itself. There is a large gap in our knowledge covering 
the periods circa 650 B.C. - 620 B.C. and 565 B.C. - 535 B.C. To put it in starker 
terms, for more than a third of the period this study is concerned with, we simply have 
no evidence. Unfortunately, this means that any conclusions reached must at best be 
tentative if we seek to apply them to the intervening gaps as well as the specific points 
in time from which they are drawn. However, it will be seen that pragmatism and 
opportunism mean that political motivations for actions were ever changing during 
the Saite period.
To add to the historian's sense of despair, much of the evidence from shores 
further afield is inherently problematical; be it the historically ambiguous Biblical 
material or the much-maligned testimony of Herodotus, discussed shortly. It is 
apparent that the sheer variety of sources also poses a problem in itself, for the scholar 
investigating this period must deal not only with Egyptian monumental texts and 
archaeological evidence, but also with a variety of sources from peoples with quite 
different historical traditions, such as the Assyrians and the Greeks (the term 'Greeks'
is used here for convenience, but it should be remembered that there was in the 
seventh and sixth centuries B.C. no concept of Greece as a nation-state, simply a 
number of poleis).
Despite these obstacles, a synthetic approach taking into account the 
individual drawbacks, and, indeed, strengths, of each source should prove successful. 
In terms of the Egyptian material, the majority of the little we do have is of a textual 
nature. Archaeologically speaking, however, the excavations at Naukratis2 for 
example have provided us with a variety of pottery and other finds that suggest certain 
key points about the relationship between the Aegean and Egypt during this period. 
Nevertheless, the material from Naukratis is not without problems since, as much as 
anything else, as Moller intimates, the sheer wealth of material from the site, and the 
fact that much of it remains unpublished, makes it a difficult task to draw 
conclusions.3 Although archaeological material is always of critical importance, one 
problem, which is not the case with the material from Naukratis, is that it can 
occasionally be difficult to tell the origins or uses of finds, especially when dealing 
with Egyptian material where there is often the further problem of insecure or 
unknown provenance.
The textual material, on the other hand, presents us with a different set of 
problems. Much of it consists of monumental inscriptions set up by the Saite kings; a 
good example is the Victory Stela of Psammetichus II found at Shellal.4 Although it 
would be unwise to take the proud posturing of kings as gospel truth, it would be just 
as unwise to dismiss pharaonic claims as brazen fabrication. Therefore, great care
2 Initially excavated by Sir William Flinders Petrie in 1884-1885, although after a 
series of campaigns in the years 1886-1903 led by various other archaeologists, there 
was a lack of further meaningful work till the excavations that took place from 1980 
to 1983 under the aegis of William D.E. Coulson and Albert Leonard, Jr.
3 Moller 2000:90
4 First published in Bakry 1967:225-244
must be taken when dealing with this material in terms of judging to what extent we 
can take the text at face value.
If, as in the case of this example, several copies of the text are known,5 then 
that raises further questions as to why the king wanted this information disseminated. 
This underlines the fact that it is important to look not only at the text itself but also 
the context within which it was placed. On a more specific level, this particular 
source raises many questions - why was there a lag in reaction to the Nubian 
domination? Does this gap suggest other reasons for the campaign? What might 
these reasons be? These questions will be discussed in chapter two.
An earlier stela of a generally similar character is one known as Stela VII of 
Psammetichus I from Saqqara.6 One of the problems in this case is that the text is 
broken, with the lower part of the stela missing, preventing us from knowing how the 
text concludes as well as ensuring considerable lacunae at the end of each line, which 
in turn prevents us from being certain about how the campaign ended - this 
demonstrates another type of limitation that occasionally crops up with these sources.
Another possible problem with monumental texts is displayed by Amasis' 
Elephantine Stela which has been interpreted7 as representative of a propaganda 
campaign retrospectively portraying support for the rebel king Amasis. If this is the 
case, then it needs to be taken into consideration when looking at the writings of 
Herodotus, for example, who would have been seeking information from people who 
would have had the time and opportunity to have been affected by a long-running 
propaganda campaign. Such questioning of veracity becomes particularly important
5 Copies are known from Tanis and Karnak as well as Shellal. All three are published 
in Der Manuelian 1994
6 First published by Goedicke 1962:33-44, although later publications in Der 
Manuelian 1994:323-332 and Perdu 2002a:30-35 both contain a number of 
amendments. 
7 Leahyl988:197-199
during this period as despite the fact that we have sources from a wide variety of 
different peoples, very rarely do several sources treat the same events.
As well as monumental texts, there are documents written on papyrus such as 
Papyrus Rylands IX. 8 Although the very nature of this text is uncertain, it has most 
recently been seen as being a family chronicle of some sort,9 perhaps prepared in 
connection with a legal case, certainly dating from the Persian period. Its interest for 
our purposes however comes from the mention of an expedition to the Levant, during 
the reign of Psammetichus II. That this campaign took place is not in much doubt, for 
although the document spans a considerable length of time, this event seems to have 
taken place approximately eighty years before it was written, 10 probably a short 
enough amount of time for the information to be relatively accurate.
One area of uncertainty, however, is exactly where the campaign was to, and 
to what extent it was of a military nature. Concerning the exact location of the 
campaign, the papyrus lists Hr (Khor), 1 ' which in the New Kingdom was the name for 
what is now Palestine, 12 but it is far from certain that this meaning was retained in the 
Late Period, and this uncertainty hinders any possible conclusions. As can be seen 
from this brief and partial overview, the Egyptian sources alone provide us with many 
problems to overcome and questions to consider.
Regrettably, Psammetichus II's campaign to Khor is not mentioned in any of 
the Western Asian material available. However, there is a wealth of other information 
pertaining to Egypt. The earliest sources of interest for our purposes are the Assyrian 
annals; that is, records of campaigns of the Assyrian kings which include much
8 First published, exemplarily, in Griffith 1909, more recently in Vittmann 1998a and 
Vittmann 1998b.
9 Chauveau 2004
10 As suggested by Griffith 1909:93
11 Vittmann 1998a: 162
12 Tvedtnes 1981:140
information on the invasion of Egypt. 13 Although my use of the term 'records' might 
suggest that these sources are impartial observations of events, in fact they were 
written from a dogmatic viewpoint whereby armies attack and punish on behalf of the 
god Assur, rather than for any other pragmatic or strategic motive. If, indeed, motives 
for actions cannot be easily extrapolated from these sources, the events themselves 
can be relatively securely dated due to the chronological format of Assyrian 
campaigns (one a year, essentially).
Moving onto later periods, we have sources of a similar nature written by the 
Babylonians. 14 Although these are often painted as more dispassionate accounts than 
the Assyrian annals, an anti-Assyrian point of view stemming from the fractious 
relations of the period is visible and thus must be taken into account, especially as the 
Egyptians are often mentioned in conjunction with the Assyrians. It is frustrating for 
the Egyptologist that the reason for the Egyptians joining forces with the Assyrians is 
not explicitly stated, but then it is wholly unrealistic to expect this to be included since 
analysis was not the purpose of these texts. Rather, they were simply a record of what 
had happened that year, with no commentary on the whys and wherefores - possible 
motives will however be discussed in later chapters.
If the Western Asian material is of a different character to the Egyptian 
material, then the biblical material 15 is of a different kind again. The problem with 
using it for our purposes is all too apparent; if theological-political concerns play a 
key role in shaping most of the texts mentioned so far, then that is even more the case 
with the books of the Old Testament which deal with events of the Saite period. The 
prophetic books in particular are difficult to use since although they may refer to
13 Handily collected in Pritchard 1969
14 Also published in Grayson 1975 as well as Pritchard 1969
15 References to events which bear on the topic of this study can be found in the books 
of Jeremiah, II Kings, II Chronicles, and Ezekiel.
8historical events, this is often a matter of contentious debate, relying on interpretation 
of oblique imagery which was used to serve the didactic undercurrent.
Perhaps it could be said that the more obviously 'historical' books, such as the 
Second Book of Chronicles, are more trustworthy although this is again somewhat a 
contentious point, and it is certainly true that any distinction here between the 
divinely-engendered ravings of prophets and the careful considerations of historians is 
an oversimplification. Nevertheless, the problem remains that these texts are 
notoriously difficult to get to grips with.
Perhaps easier to use are the writings from the Greek world concerned with 
Egypt. In this case, we are dealing principally with Herodotus, since subsequent 
writers often leant on his knowledge rather heavily. Herodotus has been called many 
things, not all of them complimentary, and certainly his early history of Egypt should 
be viewed with a healthy amount of suspicion. It is just as certain however that from 
the Saite period onwards there was an influx of Greek people in Egypt, and Herodotus 
could have had meaningful dialogue with this community during his travels in Egypt. 
Consequently, his description of this period seems much more informed, even if here 
and there one can detect occasional flights of fancy and a perhaps understandable urge 
to mythologise.
Herodotus mentions the presence of Carians in Egypt 16 and we have evidence 
along these lines in the shape of Carian inscriptions attesting to the presence of 
communities in Egypt, mainly from Saqqara, 17 but the problem in this case is that, 
although advances have been made since the publications of Masson's works, 18 
Carian is still far from understood. It is indeed difficult to extrapolate a great deal of
16 Herodotus II. 151-155
17 To be found, for example, in Masson 1978
18 See Ray 1982 and Ray 1995
information explicitly from this evidence, but as the presence of foreigners in Egypt 
certainly affected political thinking during the Saite period, this evidence must be kept 
in mind.
As can be seen, the difficulty posed by the varying types of material, allied to 
the need to combine them together, suggests that a chronological review of the period 
is the best - certainly the most straightforward - way of dealing with these 
complexities, with Egyptian, Western Asian, Biblical and Greek material all to be 
used in an analysis of the emergence of Psammetichus I in what has become known as 
the Saite renaissance.
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,,19Chapter One: "Those kings who had repeatedly schemed...
The difficulty with attempting to analyse the foreign relations of the early 
kings of the Saite dynasty is that first the actions of their predecessors in the Twenty- 
fifth dynasty must be examined to establish context. Therefore, I will briefly provide 
an overview of these actions, before moving onto the fall of Necho I and the rise of 
Psammetichus I.
Although the Twenty-fifth dynasty's presence in Egypt was formally 
inaugurated by Piye's excursion north in year 21 of his reign,20 it is not until the 
reigns of his successors that we have information about foreign relations, no doubt a 
result of Piye returning to his base in Nubia after the campaign. One notable event, 
not in keeping with much of what followed, was when in 707/6 B.C. lamani of 
Ashdod was extradited by Shebitku to Sargon of Assyria, whose aggressive expansion 
westward he had tried to flee from. 21 Shebitku was, at the onset of his reign at least, 
not prepared to take sides against Assyria.
Nevertheless, following Sargon's death, no such reticence was shown, and tensions 
escalated into a pitched battle between an Egyptian force and that of Sennacherib, at 
Eltekeh, in 701 B.C. 22 While this clash itself seems to have been more of a stalemate 
than an outright victory by either side,23 it is certainly no exaggeration to suggest that 
as a whole Sennacherib's western campaign was strikingly successful, and resulted in
19 Ashurbanipal's description of, amongst others, Necho I and Psammetichus I, see 
Pritchard 1969:295
20 The stela commemorating this event is published in Grimal 1981. See Frame 1999, 
Redford 1999 and Kahn 2001 for a more up-to-date discussion of Kushite chronology 
(Piye's year 21 corresponding to 734 BC - Kahn 2001:18).
21 Pritchard 1969:286
22 Related in the final edition of the Annals of Sennacherib, translated in Pritchard 
1969:287
23 See Kitchen 1983 for an informative discussion of possible outcomes.
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a situation whereby pharaoh could claim little influence over the city-states of the 
Levant.
Under Taharqa, however, after a time seemingly spent paying attention to 
domestic consolidation, it seems that a more substantial presence in the Levant was 
desired, as Taharqa's inscription from the seventh pylon at Karnak suggests.24 This 
time, the resulting, probably retaliatory, Assyrian campaign of 671 B.C., under 
Esarhaddon, reached as far as Egypt, removing the Kushite vestiges of authority and 
driving Taharqa south, although little more was done in terms of attempting to 
incorporate Egypt into the empire. Once the Assyrians had retreated, Taharqa 
attempted to re-establish his rule, and this eventually prompted Ashurbanipal's first 
campaign, wanting to right the wrongs that had been perpetrated at the end of his 
father's reign. We have an in-depth knowledge of this campaign due to 
Ashurbanipal's historical prisms, most recently published, with a vast number of new 
joins, by Borger.25
Ashurbanipal once more drove Taharqa south, and reinstated the kings and 
governors who had ruled on a more local level, notably including "Necho (Ni-ku-u), 
king of Memphis and Sais (Sa-a-a)".26 The fact that Necho I is first named perhaps 
reflects the relative power of the house of Sais, with his sphere of influence including 
the historically important political and religious centre Memphis. Indeed, it seems 
that other rulers of the Delta, such as Akanosh of Sebennytos, were already starting to 
rally round Necho I as a counterpoint to Kushite power. 27
24 Published by Vernus 1975. The key phrase which interests us, addressed to Amun, 
is found on p.31 "puisse-je lefaire...avec ton tribute de la terre de Khor qu 'on a 
detournee de toi"
25 Borger 1996, see particularly pp.210-215 for the campaigns against Egypt, and
pp.217-219 for the Gyges episode.
2<rPritchard 1969:294
27 As suggested by Perdu 2002b:1238, and Perdu 2004:105
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Having established this political situation, Ashurbanipal then returned to 
Assyria although some troops remained in Egypt. Despite the claim that "I made the 
garrisons stronger than before"28 it is unlikely that this presence was much more than 
the very minimum needed; it should always be remembered that despite any posturing 
to the contrary "even a great power's ability to react was restricted because of the 
difficulty of operating a relatively small army in extensive areas".29
Although their number may well have been limited, these troops nevertheless 
became aware of plotting by the very same Delta 'kinglets' Ashurbanipal had 
recognised, aiming to return Taharqa to the throne. 30 Presumably the motivation for 
this was that Kushite rule had been more laissez-faire than that of those other 
foreigners, the Assyrians. On the other hand, that a revolt was planned in the first 
place suggests that the Assyrian presence in Egypt was somewhat ephemeral; 
rebellions are rarely undertaken in close proximity to a large, well-drilled and 
experienced, locally-stationed military force. Although Ashurbanipal's reaction to 
this rebellion will be examined more closely presently, suffice it to say for now that 
Egypt was raided once more, and the rebels were punished.
Our dependence on Assyrian textual sources for this period has perhaps 
overemphasised the success of the Assyrian invasions. It is important to remember 
that it is likely that the Assyrians never had any long-term ambitions to incorporate 
Egypt into their empire, rather merely to pacify it in order to strengthen their hold on 
the Levant. No doubt, as Eph'al underlines, this was as much to do with the logistics 
involved as any recognition of Egypt as a great power. 31 Regrettably little is known 
of how the Assyrian war effort was managed; transporting all of the army's
28 Pritchard 1969:294
29 Eph'al 1983:96
30 Pritchard 1969:295
31 Eph'al 1983:99
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equipment from Assyria to Egypt for each campaign would have been a massive 
undertaking, but we have no evidence of strategically-placed arsenals that might have 
lessened this considerable expenditure of time and effort. 32
A key point to be made is that the Kushite kings were intensely pragmatic 
when it came to foreign relations, in contrast with the dogmatic nature that one might 
expect from their expressed devotion to Amun. This pragmatism manifested itself as 
switching between a policy of conciliation and interference with Assyria as the times 
demanded. Retrospectively, this seems like a foolish game to have played, and 
perhaps meek obeisance would have ensured the Twenty-fifth Dynasty's survival, but 
the Kushites had no reason to fear that Assyria would actually cross the Wadi el- 
Arish. Furthermore, success overseas would have been a useful way of papering over 
the cracks of Egypt's political make-up. The fact that the political division between 
Upper and Lower Egypt can be seen in Tanutamani's Dream stela33 just as much as in 
Piye's aforementioned triumphal stela suggests that they did not succeed in this aim. 
Psammetichus I would not make the same mistake.
Turning to look at the actions of the nascent Twenty-sixth Dynasty, 
Ashurbanipal's reaction to the Egyptian rebellion is of great interest. As has been 
mentioned, the Assyrians discovered the Egyptian plans for rebellion, but it is their 
subsequent actions that stand out as not quite being what one might have expected. 
The rebels were rounded up and carried away to Nineveh. Here, they were all 
executed, except that Ashurbanipal "had only mercy upon Necho and granted him 
life",34 and also his son, the future Psammetichus I.
32 op. cit.:101-2
33 Most recently published in Breyer 2003; a relatively recent English translation is to 
be found in Eide, Hagg, Pierce, & Torok 1994:193-207
34 Pritchard 1969:295
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Indeed, not only was Necho I not killed, but he was rewarded with a treaty, 
gifts, and was returned to rule in Sais and Memphis, while Psammetichus I, referred 
to in the texts by the Assyrian name Nabushezibanni, was given rule of Athribis.35 
The actual nature of the treaty is open to interpretation, Spalinger stating "It is highly 
probable that this treaty, although obviously recognizing some type of Assyrian 
sovereignty over Egypt, also recognized how fragile that hold really was". 36 As such, 
some arrangement whereby Necho I was allowed to essentially do as he wished with 
Egypt as long as it was not to the direct detriment of Assyria is probably to be 
imagined.
Given the Assyrians' not unwarranted reputation for brutality, well 
demonstrated by other aspects of their response to the attempted rebellion,37 this 
clemency is striking, yet we must remember that we only have the Assyrian viewpoint 
for this particular incident - why was the act of clemency mentioned in this account? 
It is possible that Ashurbanipal's magnanimity is supposed to impress the reader, but 
bearing in mind how little is made of it elsewhere, it seems more likely that the 
passage is included primarily to suggest that the Egyptians are in debt to the Assyrians 
for this act of mercy.
The description of the act of mercy itself is tantalizing, and the mention of 
gifts makes the exchange seem more vivid to the modern reader, but ultimately 
reveals little about any possible motivations. The obvious question concerning this 
event is, why? Why did the Assyrians spare the life of one of the Egyptian rebels? 
Why was the recipient of this mercy specifically Necho I? It is possible that this 
represents a major change in thinking on the part of the Assyrians. Although the
35 op. cit.:295
36 Spalinger 1974b:323
37 "They hung their corpses from stakes, flayed their skins and covered.. .the wall of 
the town" - Pritchard 1969:295
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Assyrians stationed in Egypt had discovered the rebellion and therefore justified their 
having been left behind, it is extremely debatable as to how long the Assyrians were 
willing to maintain a presence in Egypt, and as to how long such a presence would 
have been capable of suppressing native power.
On the other hand, a relatively strong king in the Delta, owing his position of 
strength, and indeed his life, to Assyrian kindness, would be able to prevent Egyptian 
meddling in the Levant at its source. Although it has long been thought that Necho I 
was the strongest Nile Delta leader of the time, Perdu's publication of a donation stela 
of Akanosh, a ruler of Sebennytos, who dates according to Necho, underlines the fact 
that his power-base was greater than just the western Delta, at least including the area 
of Sebennytos in the north of the central area of the Delta.38 Further, as has been 
mentioned earlier, it seems that he may have also been trying to offset Kushite power 
himself.39
The impetus for this change in Assyrian thinking may have come from Necho 
I himself, using every diplomatic trick he knew to not only safeguard his life but also 
to ensure he retained power in Egypt. Tempting though this interpretation is, it cannot 
be substantiated and must remain a supposition at best. Whether the initiative belongs 
to the Assyrians or Necho I, it certainly suited both, and it no doubt reinforced in 
Necho's mind, and that of the observing Psammetichus I, that diplomacy can be far 
more effective than simple dogmatic belligerence - this is one of the strong themes 
underlying the actions of the Twenty-sixth Dynasty.
Psammetichus I may well have also noted how useful foreign aid can be. 
Certainly, he was not afraid to turn to others for help against fellow 'Egyptians', as 
events following the attempted invasion of Tanutamani show. The invasion is
38 Perdu 2002b: 1236
39 ibid.:1238, and Perdu 2004:105
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detailed in the aforementioned Dream Stela, wherein a dream in which Tanutamani 
sees two snakes is interpreted as suggesting "South-land is yours (already), now seize 
for yourself North-land" (iw n(y)=k Ta-rsy it_ n=k Ts-mhw).40 A campaign northwards 
follows, which Necho attempted to repulse41 although it seems that he died in 
attempting to do so - Herodotus mentions him dying in an attack by "Sabacos the 
Ethiopian".42 This is clearly incorrect, as he was certainly still alive during Taharqa's 
reign, and, unless Herodotus has simply made a mistake, must therefore refer to a 
later Ethiopian king, i.e. Tanutamani; unfortunately Assyrian sources are silent on the 
death of Necho I.
Our only source regarding the actions of Psammetichus I during this period, 
Herodotus, suggests he fled to Syria. 43 In Classical sources, Syria and Assyria were 
often confused,44 and that Psammetichus fled to Nineveh would certainly be more 
than possible, remembering that he had been given the name Nabushezibanni in 
Nineveh previously, reflective either of an attempt to 'Assyrianize' him, or as a 
"token of friendship". 45 Of course, it is certainly also possible that this episode in 
Herodotus is a garbled version of that earlier journey. Even if we do take Herodotus 
literally, 'Syria' was at the time still part of the Assyrian Empire, and as such fleeing 
there would probably have led to the same result, politically, as fleeing to Nineveh, 
although again one must consider the not unlikely possibility that Herodotus was 
simply wrong on this count.
40 Translation and transliteration following Eide, Hagg, Pierce, & Torok 1994:197
41 See Eide, Hagg, Pierce, & Torok 1994:200. Necho I is not named, but a battle took 
place in the vicinity of Memphis, after which Pakruru of Per-Soped appears to be 
leader of the rebels, not Necho I as would be expected if he was alive at the time.
42 Herodotus II. 152
43 Herodotus II. 152
44 Lloyd 1988:132
45 Spalinger 1974a:325
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Nevertheless, I feel Psammetichus I leaving the country would have been quite 
feasible and here the pragmatic actions of Psammetichus, choosing to flee to the 
safety provided by his foreign friends rather than risk death at the hands of a Kushite 
force, not only saved his life but probably played a large role in his eventual return in 
a position of power. The Assyrian sources, however, neglect to mention 
Psammetichus I in the description of Ashurbanipal's return to Egypt to punish 
Tanutamani, culminating with the famous sacking of Thebes.46 On the other hand, 
Herodotus includes no mention at all of the Assyrians in his account of the rise of 
Psammetichus.47
It seems likely that this absence of Assyrians is to be explained by the fact that 
Herodotus is relating a nationalistic, propagandist Egyptian version of history that he 
was exposed to. It is easy to imagine a situation whereby over many years 
Psammetichus I and his successors instigated a portrayal of the king as a returning 
hero, saving Egypt from the foreign rule of the Kushites, although as Lloyd points out 
there are also Greek flourishes to the story (notably the enigmatic manner of the 
oracles).48
On the other hand, we should not be surprised that the Assyrian sources 
neglect to mention Psammetichus I. Naturally, the intent in the description of this 
campaign is to emphasise the might of Assyria, therefore admitting to involvement by 
others (no matter how minimal it may have been) would be counterproductive. It 
seems, though, that the success of Ashurbanipal's campaign presumably weakened 
the other Delta leaders, while returning Psammetichus I to his father's former power 
base.
46 Pritchard 1969:295
47 Herodotus II. 151-152
48 Lloyd 1988:160
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However, it is nevertheless difficult to see how Psammetichus I could have 
amassed enough manpower from his fellow countrymen for his unification of Egypt at 
this point, with him still being one power amongst many (although, with Sais, 
Memphis, and Athribis under his control, his was a significant power). We turn again 
to Herodotus for his rather picaresque description of how Psammetichus I came to 
employ Carian and Ionian troops - after being told by an oracle that 'men of bronze' 
would come to his aid, the sceptical Psammetichus was informed in just these terms 
of men "voyaging for plunder...forced to put in on the coast of Egypt, where they 
disembarked in their mail of bronze"49 with whom he then made friends. Although it 
is indeed possible that shipwrecked pirates were recruited by Psammetichus, it seems 
unlikely that this would provide as great a number of mercenaries as the Egyptian 
king, "a rich man with problems", 50 would have needed. Sullivan sees the tale in 
Herodotus as the residue of "a systematic policy pursued by Psammetichus to obtain 
foreign assistance". 51 If then, Psammetichus I sought this aid, rather than reacting to a 
fortuitous turn of events, where did he get it from?
One possibility is from Gyges, king of Lydia. The Rassam Cylinder includes 
a passage mentioning how Gyges sent troops to Psammetichus I, who is described as 
having "thrown off the yoke of my sovereignty". 52 Spalinger sees the two as 
unrelated, suggesting that the troops were used to secure power in the Delta rather 
than to expel the Assyrians,53 whereas Lloyd suggests that the proximity of the two 
statements implies a link between the two, 54 and I am inclined to agree with him. 
Although it is certainly possible that Psammetichus concentrated on strengthening his
49 Herodotus II. 152
50 Ray 1995:1189
51 Sullivan 1996:186
52 Luckenbill 1927:298
53 Spalinger 1976:135
54 Lloyd 1988:134-135
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hold on the Delta before removing the Assyrian 'yoke' it is hard to see why he would 
have used the mercenaries in the earlier action, but not the later. It is better to 
visualise Psammetichus I's expansion in the Delta as a process of diplomacy backed 
with military means and threats, and his removal of the Assyrians as part of the same 
process, but with perhaps more achieved militarily than diplomatically.
Herodotus then goes on to mention the founding of stratopeda. 55 Although 
the actual location and foundation date of these camps is disputed,56 their very 
establishment is of interest. It is impossible to know whether Psammetichus I had 
these camps in mind as a long term power-base supporting him, or merely as a short 
term bulwark in the initial turbulent phase of his reign. In light of the political 
shrewdness suggested by the length of his reign it is tempting to go with the former 
suggestion, and in this respect it is of great interest that a Carian form of the name 
Psammetichus is common in Carian inscriptions found in Egypt dating from the Saite 
period, suggesting a sense of loyalty and gratitude to the king. 57 The location
so
Herodotus mentions, on the Pelusiac branch of the Nile, does also suggest a strong 
defensive motive, since "The Pelusiac mouth of the Nile had for centuries served as a 
major point of defence for Egypt against traditional enemies in the Levant or those 
who approached by sea". 59
Perhaps we should view the founding of Naukratis in a similar way. That is 
certainly the supposition that Sullivan makes in an informed discussion of the 
possibilities.60 Although a statement by Herodotus61 has been interpreted as
55 Herodotus II. 154
56 See Smolarikova 2002:97-101 for a discussion of changing scholarly opinions on 
the location of these stratopeda.
57 Ray 1982:189
58 Herodotus II. 154
59 Sullivan 1996:186
60 Sullivan 1996
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suggesting that Amasis was behind the foundation of Naukratis, more recent views 
suggest that "the reign of Psammetichus I seems likely for the inception of Naukratis, 
and probably early rather than late". 62 The dating early in the reign of this pioneering 
king is contentious but although only a small amount of the pottery found has been 
assigned to as early a date as circa 650 B.C., this can be partly explained since 
Naukratis was probably initially a rather small settlement and if this was the case then 
even a small number of early finds would thus take on an increased significance. 63
On the other hand, an attractive possibility, which fits the political picture of 
the time, is that Naukratis began life as being of a military character, and therefore 
"Little leisure for large-scale manufacture of pottery would be available". 64 It should 
be remembered that although it was later formalised, under Psammetichus I "The 
initial arrangement need have been no more than a loose agreement that Greeks in his 
service could locate there, only a few miles from his capital...with an arm of the 
Nile...available". 65
Again, was this just a short term measure, bolstering the western Delta? Or 
was a more long term strategy involved, especially since "Egyptian external trade 
is...characterized by inactivity...the...Pharaoh...regarded the Greeks as welcome 
transporters of much-desired prestige items and made available to them a 'port of 
trade'"?66 It is difficult to answer this question, but either way, the length and relative 
stability of the reign of Psammetichus I (especially compared to the uncertainty that 
preceded it) no doubt contributed to the growth of Naukratis in importance.
61 "he gave those [Greeks] who came to Egypt the city of Naucratis to dwell in" - 
Herodotus II. 178
62 Sullivan 1996:190
63 ibid.: 188
64 ibid.: 188
65 ibid.: 190
66 Moller 2000:32
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The presence of the aforementioned mercenaries in Egypt does however pose 
a question when we come to interpret Stela VII from Saqqara,67 which unlike the 
simple boundary markers along the Dahshur road is, along with Taharqa's stela 
relating the prowess of his army, one of two "memorial stones properly speaking".68 
There are certain problems with using this stela, dated to Year 11 of the king (654 
B.C.), not least the fact that the text is damaged, and indeed the entire lower portion of 
the stela is missing. How much of the stela is lost is open to question,69 but in this 
instance we are certainly trying to view history through a broken window.
In the stela, Psammetichus I, having returned from spending time at what 
seems to be a building with an oblique connection to Amenemhet I,70 is told that 
Libyans are responsible for "some sort of trouble...at hand to the west of Egypt",71 
although the incompleteness of the initial statement prevents us from knowing much 
more detail. Spalinger interprets the situation as being that "the Libyans had control 
of the Western territory of Egypt from the Bahr Youssef area around the Fayum to the 
Mediterranean"72 but the fact remains that we cannot be completely sure of the scope 
and seriousness of the situation.
Of great interest is the phrase - "Then were pronounced the name(s) of the 
mayors of every town, in order to mobilize the great ones" (st dm.tw rn n tetyw-' nw 
niwt nbt r thm wrw). 74 Although Spalinger points out that this is important - 
"Psammetichus had to call upon his nome leaders to supply him with troops-the
67 Most recently published by Perdu 2002a
68 Moussa 1981:334
69 Der Manuelian 1994:330 suggests that perhaps a greater part is missing than is 
usually thought
70 See Der Manuelian 1994:328 for a brief discussion of this problem
71 ibid.:329
72 Spalinger 1976:140
73 Perdu 1986:27
74 Translation and transliteration following Der Manuelian 1994:325
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monarchy did not have at its disposal a ready standing army"75 - he takes the view 
that Psammetichus I had not acquired his mercenaries by this point, perfectly 
understandably since their arrival is not securely dated, but one is still tempted to 
believe that they would have been used in his unification of Egypt, and therefore 
would have been in Egypt at this time.
As such, the real question is, why would Psammetichus I need to levy troops if 
he had a bevy of experienced soldiers waiting for his command? It suggests that the 
motivation for this action was as much political as it was military - ensuring different 
local troops fought together as a unified force would prove a singularly effective way 
of transferring local loyalties into national ones. This would also add further 
resonance to the stela if it is true that barracks lay at the end of the Dahshur road,76 
underlining the unity and strength of Egypt to the very troops that supported it. 
Spalinger rather sees it as an act of 'broadening his horizons' now that "he was secure 
in his domain"77 but I think this rather simplifies the complex balancing act of 
domestic and foreign politics.
This military action could also have served as an effective means of erasing 
doubts possibly resulting from the fact that Psammetichus I's "ancestry was probably 
of Libyan origin". 78 If this was the case, it was probably at least successful in this 
regard, although one must be slightly reticent in agreeing with Basta's assertion that 
the other Dahshur stelae were buried by Libyans "who apparently wished to hide the 
records of their defeat by King Psmatek (sic) I. This could have happened... after the 
Saitic era, perhaps in the Persian time",79 since the ability of the Libyans to read the
75 Spalinger 1978a: 15
76 Decreed likely by Basta 1968:62-3
77 Spalinger 1976:140
78 Spalinger 1982a: 1166
79 Basta 1968:62
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stelae must be questioned. This rather realpolitik interpretation of why Psammetichus 
mounted this campaign does not suggest that this was necessarily a manufactured 
threat on Egypt's western border, and it is certainly possible also that some of the so- 
called machimoi had left the Delta to join forces with the Libyans after Psammetichus 
I's expansion,80 although the idea of them reacting in such a way to the influx of 
Greeks is possibly somewhat overemphasising the Greek presence and influence 
during this period.
Although the inconclusive ending of the stela prevents us from knowing 
exactly how the campaign ended, the fact that the stela exists in itself suggests a 
positive outcome for the Egyptian king and goes some way to rebutting Assman's 
judgement on the Saite dynasty, "that enacting the past was more important than
n -I
shaping the present". Also suggesting the campaign was successful are subsequent 
events; all seems to have been quiet on the Western border of Egypt for the remainder 
of Psammetichus I's reign, although this could of course also be due to an accident of 
preservation. Nevertheless, our inability to be certain of the details of this action is 
well transmitted by the various possibilities mooted in der Manuelian's summing up: 
"it seems that the king succeeded in surrounding and defeating his enemies, and either
Q'J
building some sort of containment structure, or attacking that of the Libyans".
In conclusion, it can be seen that although the Saite dynasty may well 
have come to power through a weakness in Egyptian foreign relations, Necho I and, 
especially, Psammetichus I quickly proved themselves to be more than able at 
exploiting diplomacy for their own ends. In the period that has been covered so far 
one would probably say that an initial concentration on securing internal defence can
80 As suggested by Spalinger 1976:140
81 Assmann 2002:341
82 Der Manuelian 1994:324
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be seen, making Egypt ready for the more outward-looking phase that will be 
examined in the following chapter.
25 
Chapter Two: Building On New Foundations
After the flurry of activity during the early reign of Psammetichus I, securely-dated 
evidence for foreign relations becomes sparser, indeed non-existent, till the final years 
of his rule. Egypt's foreign relations under his successors Necho II and 
Psammetichus II are, by the standards of the Saite period, very well known, attested 
by a number of sources, although many of these sources are beset with problems.
Why then is there this disparity, in terms of the evidence that survives, 
between the majority of the reign of Psammetichus I, and those of his immediate 
successors? An accident of preservation is perhaps the most appealing explanation, 
especially if we take into account the fact that Sais, the political centre of the time, is 
not preserved to the same standard as, say, New Kingdom Thebes (which does 
provide us with information on foreign relations of that period). It should also be 
pointed out that, for the most part, "the practice of celebrating foreign involvements 
and successes by making them public in text and relief, a fad of the New Kingdom, 
had long since fallen into abbeyance", 83 though, as we shall see, Psammetichus II 
proved an exception. Nevertheless, it does seem surprising that this accident of 
preservation within Egypt should be reproduced without, where there is again no 
evidence from this middle period that seems to deal with the actions of Psammetichus 
I.
Another possible reason was that the upheaval of the previous decades of 
foreign interference led Psammetichus I to concentrate on domestic matters rather 
than anything outside Egypt's borders. On the other hand, the sheer length of his
83 Redford2000:183
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reign suggests a level of political stability that would have provided a strong 
foundation suitable for furthering foreign relations.
One example of an incident that may be dated to this unknown mid-period of 
Psammetichus I's reign is his siege of Ashdod, as related by Herodotus: 
"Psammetichus ruled Egypt for fifty-four years; for twenty-nine of these he sat before 
Azotus...and besieged it till he took it". 84 The archaeological evidence85 seems to 
uphold Herodotus' record of Egyptian violence against Ashdod, for after the 
destruction of Stratum VII, Stratum VI, which lasted "until the end of the seventh 
century BCE and the rise of Babylon",86 seems to have been under Egyptian 
influence, as suggested by the presence of a number of hieroglyphic inscriptions. 87
If we thus accept that a siege did take place, it is harder to countenance it 
lasting twenty-nine years; especially since even Herodotus himself seems
on
disbelieving. This extraordinary length has been ingeniously justified in a variety of 
ways by different scholars, but there is always the possibility that Herodotus was 
simply incorrect on this point, that it is "a mere fiction". 89 It could be an intended 
reference to Herodotus' earlier mention of the Scythians ruling Asia for twenty-eight 
years,90 implying that Psammetichus I besieged Ashdod during this time and 
ultimately ended their rule, but that seems somewhat unlikely.
Strange and Tadmor have suggested that the siege took place in the twenty- 
ninth regnal year of Psammetichus I,91 and Herodotus misunderstood his information.
84 Herodotus II. 157
85 See Dothan & Freedman 1967 and Dothan 1971 for excavation reports.
86 Dever 1997:220 
87 Malamatl974a:447
88 "Azotus held out against siege longer than any city of which I have heard", 
Herodotus II. 157
89 Spalinger 1977:223
90 Herodotus 1.106
91 Strange 1966:136 and Tadmor 1966:102
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Dothan thought that "This town may have been destroyed by Psametik about sixty 
years later"92 than 712 B.C. although the archaeological record is not as illuminating 
as one would like. Lloyd sees the time range of circa 655 to 630 as most likely,93 but 
one must accept that this statement of Herodotus simply does not allow us to date this 
event precisely. 94 It surely, however, happened before Psammetichus I's troops 
crossed the Euphrates (vide infra), so a terminus ante quern of 616 B.C. seems fair.
Why would Psammetichus I have moved against Ashdod? Firstly, it was a site 
of substantial tactical importance, needed for "control of Philistia...whilst any 
northern power with ambitions to the south had to take or.. .neutralize it".95 Securing 
Ashdod would have been a vital first step towards re-founding Egyptian interests in 
the Levant and possibly even further afield, maybe replacing the fading power of the 
war-torn Assyrians. It has been suggested that these actions were part of "Egypt's 
traditional defensive strategy of creating a buffer-zone against, or a counterweight to, 
any great power which might threaten Egypt from that quarter".96
One interesting source relating to this area is a stela recording the burial of the 
Apis bull in 612 B.C., wherein craftsmen and their chiefs charged with preparing the 
casket, made of cedar wood (a product of the Lebanon), are termed "subjects of the 
palace, with a royal courtier placed over them".97 It seems therefore that 
Psammetichus I had control of Phoenicia at this time, which, bearing in mind the 
events of 616 and 610 B.C. (vide infra} one would fully expect. Before examining the
92 Dothan 1971:115
93 Lloyd 1988:148
94 ibid.: 148
95 ibid.: 146
96 ibid.: 147
97 Freedy & Redford 1970:477 for the translation, the text is published in Perdu 
2002a:39-41
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actions of Psammetichus further west, another presence in the Levant that possibly 
affected Egyptian interests must be mentioned - the Scythians.
Again, Herodotus is our starting point - "they marched against Egypt: and 
when they were in...Palestine, Psammetichus king of Egypt met them and persuaded 
them with gifts and prayers to come no further".98 Herodotus also describes the 
Scythians not only as "masters of all Asia",99 but further states that they "ruled Asia 
for twenty-eight years". 100 Unfortunately, none of this is reflected in the extant 
cuneiform record, although the absence of Assyrian historical texts after the 630s 
suggests that if this "historically dubious incursion" 101 by the Scythians did occur, it 
would have been during this time. 102 Muddying the issue is the fact that "La 
chronologic d'Herodote n'est...qu'une reconstitution fondee sur des calculs 
genealogiques, et cette reconstitution ne peut etre tout a fait precise". 103 Although 
earlier historians did identify the Umman-Manda of Babylonian texts as being the 
Scythians, 104 this term has now been shown to refer to the Medes. 105
One would not expect Psammetichus I to have recorded an event whereby he 
had to resort to buying off his enemies to prevent an attack (certainly not in those 
terms), or indeed, the nomadic Scythians themselves to have left evidence, but the 
limited likelihood of a Scythian hegemony of Asia suggests that few conclusions 
should be drawn from Herodotus on this incident. There is always the possibility, 
albeit somewhat unlikely, that this passage is a confusion over Psammetichus IPs trip
98 Herodotus 1.105
99 Herodotus 1.104
100 Herodotus 1.106
101 West 2002:437
102 Ivantchik 1999:511
103 Ivantchik 1993:112
104 Malamat 1950:155 for example.
105 See Zawadski 1988 for an in-depth discussion of this problem
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to Palestine (vide infra). We can at the very least however, due to the events to be 
discussed shortly, "suppose that in 616 B.C. the Scythian threat was already over". 106
For in 616 B.C. the Babylonian Chronicle records that "In the month of Tishri 
the army of Egypt and the army of Assyria went after the king of Akkad as far as 
Gablini but they did not overtake the king of Akkad (so) they withdrew". 107 It is 
reasonable to assume that for the Egyptians to have been mounting operations this far 
east, they would have had to have been secure in the belief that supply lines would not 
have been disrupted by Scythian incursions into the Levant, even allowing for the 
presence of an Egyptian garrison at Carchemish. This suggests that "Psamnietichus 
controlled the via maris as his line of supply to Egypt...it was only when Josiah 
became bold enough to attack Necho at Megiddo.. .that Judah impinged upon Egypt's 
support lines". 108
The real question here is why did Psammetichus I turn from being an enemy 
of the Assyrians during the Gyges episode into an ally in 616 B.C.? It is possible that 
the treaty drawn up when Necho I and the young Psammetichus I were taken to 
Nineveh was re-asserted and the Egyptians were fulfilling a vassal obligation, but the 
time span involved and the relative strengths of the two nations at the time renders 
this somewhat unlikely. An alliance of some sort perhaps came into being between 
622 and 617 B.C. since "in the first tablet of the Chronicle... reporting on the king's 
initial years, up to 623 B.C., there is no mention of Egypt in the struggle between 
Assyria and Babylonia". 109
It seems more than likely that the Egyptians helped the Assyrians for their 
own benefit, maybe in a far-sighted attempt to quell the power of the Babylonians,
106 Ivantchik 1999:516
107 Grayson 1975:91. Gablini was a city on the Middle Euphrates.
108 Spalingerl978b:52
109 Malamatl974a:447
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who eventually did attempt to attack Egypt during the reign of Necho II. Acts 
including the siege of Ashdod (not, as we have seen, dated, but which presumably 
happened before a campaign to the east) suggest that Egypt was already in relatively 
secure control of the Levant, so it is unlikely that Assyria ceded these territories to the 
Egyptians in return for their help; rather, the Egyptians simply moved into the power 
vacuum.
It may indeed have been that the Egyptians linked with the Assyrians so that 
they themselves would not lose the Levant to the expanding Babylonian empire. 110 
Sadly, the "gradual disintegration of Assyrian rule in Palestine in the second half of 
the 7th century B.C. is obscured by a paucity of data" 111 making it difficult to 
conclusively determine what happened. The latest evidence for an Assyrian presence 
in the area includes "Assyrian deeds of sale...at Gezer, dating to 651 and 649 
B.C...the mention of an Assyrian governor in 646 B.C...the punitive expedition 
undertaken by Ashurbanipal to.. .Tyre.. .now to be dated 644/643".' 12
Perhaps Psammetichus I desired a successful military campaign which he 
could have used to further build his prestige at home. The Babylonian Chronicle is 
completely silent on the motives of the Egyptian force, but it is tempting to suggest 
that maybe Psammetichus, who had tasted Western Asian court life early in his 
career, and owed his rule both to support from, and defeat of, the Assyrians, would 
have wanted to involve Egypt in the area.
Six years later, at the very end of Psammetichus I's reign, Egyptian troops are 
again mentioned in the Babylonian Chronicle, abandoning the town of Harran to the 
Babylonian force of Nabopolassar: "Fear of the enemy overcame Ashuruballit (II) and
110 Spalinger 1977:224 
lu Malamatl974a:446 
112 Malamat 1973:270
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the army of Eg[ypt which] had come [to help him] and they abandoned] the city". 113 
These two Egyptian involvements in Western Asia under Psammetichus I do not 
appear to have been gloriously successful campaigns, yet that might be largely due to 
the fact that it is the Babylonians who recorded them for posterity, since possessing 
the capacity to utilize troops so far from their natural base underlines the fact that 
Egypt was once more a player on the international scene.
Psammetichus I died with Egypt playing a vital, if ultimately unsuccessful, 
role in international relations. Indeed, as Smith has shown, 114 there appears to have 
been an Egyptian tradition of Psammetichus I dying abroad, which other than possibly 
reflecting the actuality of his death, might also reflect that he came to be associated 
not only with the flourishing of Egypt on the domestic front, but also on the 
international stage.
Psammetichus I's successor Necho II wasted no time in following in these 
policy footsteps, and famously clashed with the Judean king Josiah in 609 B.C. as he 
personally led a force to the Euphrates. This incident is mentioned in both II Kings - 
"Pharaoh Necho, king of Egypt, set out for the river Euphrates to the king of Assyria. 
When King Josiah confronted him, (Necho) put him to death at Megiddo as soon as 
he had seen him"115 - and a fuller (but considerably later) passage in II Chronicles. 116 
In the later account certain details are added, namely Necho II instructing Josiah not 
to confront him, and an explicit mention of a battle, conspicuously absent from the 
first telling, whereby Josiah is shot by archers and taken back to Jerusalem before 
dying.
I13 Grayson 1975:95
114 Smith 1991 for an illuminating discussion of P. Berlin 13588
115 II Kings 23:28-29
116 II Chronicles 35:20-24. II Kings is thought to have been written largely towards
the close of the seventh century B.C., with additions circa 560 B.C., while II
Chronicles is thought to have been written probably between 450 and 435 B.C.
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The II Kings passage does not have to be taken as recording a meeting on the 
battlefield, for the Hebrew does not "necessarily imply warlike action"" 7 even if it is 
often translated in such a manner. One cannot then discount the possibility that the 
meeting between Necho II and Josiah was not a battle, which could lead to a great 
deal of irresolvable speculation over the reason for Josiah's death. Putting this to one 
side, the "general impression remains of an account which, in trying to convey its 
content as shortly as possible, had ended up by being obscure". 118
The passage in II Chronicles could be taken as evidence that a military clash 
did take place, but it is important to remain aware that even more so than the other 
sources from this period "Chronicles presents history to convey a certain 
interpretation of the events". 119 In this respect it must be noted that one of the 
additions - Necho II speaking as what seems to be a prophet of God ("God has 
purposed me to speed me on my way, and God is on my side; do not stand in his way, 
or he will destroy you" 120), but being ignored - provides the reader with a reason for 
the untimely death of the good king Josiah, whose cultic reform should have ensured 
a long and peaceful reign. Therefore, this addition, unknown in any other source, 
conveniently fitting a theologically defined worldview, should not be viewed as 
undisputable fact.
Whether or not Josiah did meet Necho II militarily, the reason for any kind of 
delaying action or attempt to prevent free passage is relatively obscure too, since both 
the II Kings and II Chronicles passages make it clear that Necho II was merely 
passing through Judah on his way to help the Assyrians. Moreover, the Egyptians
117 Cogan & Tadmor 1988:301
118 Frost 1968:373
119 Jones 1993:99 
120 II Chronicles 35
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must have made a similar movement at the end of the reign of Psammetichus I, but we 
have no evidence of Josiah attempting to stop that.
Yadin has also shown how inscription 88 from Arad could be a copy of an 
original message: "I (Assur-uballit) am now ruling in Carchemish. Do not be afraid 
(or: be strong) and let the king of Egypt cross your country and come to my help". 121 
If this is the correct interpretation (and it should be noted that this three line 
inscription had previously been seen as "an order from Jehoahaz to the commander of 
Arad to make vigorous military preparations against Pharaoh Necho II in anticipation 
of the latter's return from Harran"! 122) it disputes the suggestion that Egypt would 
have been in a much stronger position to ensure safe passage through the Levant 
themselves than the fading power of Assyria. It is difficult to reconcile this 
interpretation with what had gone on before.
It seems most likely that the loss of face the Egyptians suffered at Harran (vide 
supra), combined with the attendant possibility of support from the Babylonians who 
earlier had been "beyond the political horizon of the Kingdom of Judah" 123 and the 
ascendancy to the throne of a new, untried ruler in the form of Necho II were the 
catalysts for Josiah's action. It does, however, still seem strange, and it is perhaps 
wise to agree with Spalinger that this action must be seen as one that was unexpected 
and out of character for Josiah, and therefore difficult to explain. 124 His defeat "put 
an effective end to the prosperity of the Judean kingdom and dispelled all hopes for 
restored grandeur". 125
121 Yadin 1976:14
122 ibid. :9
123 Malamat 1950:219
124 Spalinger 1977:225
125 Malamat 1974b: 124
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Although not immediately involving himself in the decision of who should 
succeed Josiah, no doubt because of more pressing matters further east, Necho II is 
described in II Kings 23:31-35 as removing Josiah's successor Jehoahaz from power 
and replacing him with Jehoiakim, ensuring that Judah was now clearly under 
Egyptian control.
In Tammuz in the seventeenth year of Nabopolassar's reign, Necho II and the 
Assyrians were successful in retaking Harran; with Necho II's force described as "the 
large army of Egypt"126 - clearly Necho II attached a great deal of importance to this 
campaign. The Egyptian troops were so well established in the area (see figure 1) that 
in the twentieth year of Nabopolassar, 127 they besieged Kimuhu for four months 
before capturing it. We are also told that the army of Egypt was in Carchemish, 
predictably as a base for the area, although they did push the Babylonians in Quramati 
back.
The Egyptians' relative mobility in Western Asia came to an end with the 
famous battle at Carchemish in 605 B.C. The entry in the Babylonian Chronicle is 
rather dry, but describes a comprehensive victory achieved in two stages; the 
Babylonian troops, under the aegis of the crown prince Nebuchadrezzar (II) fought 
the Egyptians, who in all likelihood did not include Necho II in their number, 128 and 
as the latter retreated, in Hamath they "inflicted a [defeat] upon them (and) finished 
them off completely...They (the army of Akkad) inflicted a defeat upon them (so 
that) a single Egyptian man [did not return] home". 129
126 Grayson 1975:96
127 See Grayson 1975:98 for the following events
128 Yoyotte 1960:385
129 Grayson 1975:99
35
o Damascus
Figure 1: map of the location of Necho II's Western Asian campaigns 130
The biblical account in Jeremiah of what is probably the same battle (although 
it could be that there were multiple battles in the Carchemish area over this period) is 
more colourful, with phrases such as "Their mighty ranks shattered / They flee pell- 
mell, / Without looking back / Everywhere panic", 131 and reflects the importance of 
this event (which fitted in with Jeremiah's view of the Babylonians as an instrument 
of God coming to punish the Judeans). We also possess testimony from Carchemish 
itself, in the form of "clay seal impressions bearing the cartouche of Necho". 132
130 Map taken from http://www.kent.net/DisplacedDynasties/606-605.html 19 Sep 
2006.
131 Jeremiah 46:5
132 Woolley 1921:126
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After this battle, we have no evidence of Necho II involving himself in 
Western Asian affairs, although four years after Carchemish Nebuchadnezzar 
marched to Egypt and the two nations "fought one another in the battlefield and both 
sides suffered severe losses.. .The king of Akkad and his army turned and [went back] 
to Babylon". Although the margin of victory may have been slight, Necho II 
nevertheless succeeded in preventing a Babylonian invasion of the country, so 
perhaps his policy should be viewed as more successful than is usually the case.
Indeed, Herodotus mentions Necho II defeating the "Syrians at Magdolus, 
taking the great Syrian city of Cadytis after the battle". 134 For a variety of reasons 
well summarised by Lloyd, 135 it seems most likely that Magdolus is Migdol rather 
than Megiddo, and that Cadytis is Gaza. These identifications seem to suggest that 
the 'Syrians' were the Babylonians (Herodotus seems to use the term as a catch-all for 
the Assyrians and their Western Asian successors) and that this passage refers to the 
events of 601/600 B.C.
As has been mentioned, it is true that we have no evidence after this point for 
Egypt's presence in the Levant, but Herodotus' passage suggests it was feasible, and 
"Malgre la defaite de Karkemish, la possibilite d'une intervention egyptienne en 
Phenicie n'est pas exclue dans les decennies suivantes". 136 It could be to this time 
that the foundation of a fort at Tel Qedwa, in northern Sinai, is to be dated, although it 
could well also have been founded as part of Necho IPs initial movements east. 137 It 
may also be to this time that we are to date a letter found at Saqqara from a Levantine
133 Grayson 1975:101
134 Herodotus II. 159
135 Lloyd 1988:162-163
136 Leclantl968:17
137 See Redford 2000:185-186
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vassal addressed to a Saite pharaoh asking for aid against the Babylonians, although it 
does not seem as if his pleas for help were heeded. 138
Examining other areas of foreign relations, it can further be seen that Necho II 
was in fact a fairly astute operator, unfairly lambasted for one defeat on the 
battlefield. It has long been thought that he "appears to have been vilified by the 
Egyptians as a result of his failures in Asia and names compounded with his virtually 
disappear until the Persian Period" 139 but Gozzoli's list of monuments bearing 
Necho's name, some recut and some not, suggests that this was not the case. 140 
Although the list does include some monuments with erasure, there are also, for 
instance, monuments likely to be from Sais which have not been recut, and if there 
had been a campaign by Psammetichus II to erase the names of his father, it would 
presumably have been thoroughly followed in the capital. 141 Gozzoli also points out 
that although the erasure from donation stelae is more suggestive of a campaign to 
remove the name of Necho II, we also possess donation stelae from his reign without 
any evidence of erasure, contradicting any conclusions one might be tempted to draw 
from the other examples. 142 As such, it seems likely that there was no damnatio 
memoriae, and there is certainly not enough evidence for it to be more than an 
unlikely possibility.
Unfairly lambasted or not, it is as an astute operator that his attempt, albeit 
abandoned, to build a canal to link the Red Sea with the Mediterranean, mentioned by 
Herodotus, 143 is best explained. Sadly, we have no Egyptian evidence confirming 
Necho II's actions, and although "Darius speaks of inspecting a waterway before
138 Dupont-Sommer 1948:44
139 Spalinger 1977:232
140 Gozzoli 2000:72-77
141 ibid.:77
142 ibid. :79
143 Herodotus II. 158
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beginning his project.. .Darius may have been looking at the irrigation canal.. .through 
the Wadi Tumilat" 144 rather than Necho's earlier attempt.
Why would Necho II have wanted to build a canal between the Mediterranean 
and the Red Sea? Before answering this question, it is important to look closer at 
Herodotus, and his stated aims for Necho abandoning the project; not so much the 
Greek-style oracular pronouncement that played a role, 145 but rather the claim that 
"Necos then ceased from making the canal and engaged in warlike preparation; some 
of his ships of war were built on the northern sea, and some in the Arabian Gulf'. 146
Therefore we need to envisage a situation whereby Egypt had a maritime 
presence on both its northern and eastern coasts. As Lloyd summarises, the ships in 
the Mediterranean would have provided support to any Egyptian forces in the Levant, 
or on the other hand they could have threatened an enemy land-force, and they also 
could have formed part of a defence against any Phoenician attacks. 147 Clearly, this 
was a wise move; an Egyptian presence off the Levantine coast would no doubt have 
made Egyptian involvement in the area much more of a possibility.
If the reasons for stationing a fleet in the Mediterranean are relatively self- 
apparent, this is not really the case for the Red Sea. There is no evidence that the 
Babylonians would have attacked by crossing the Arabian Gulf. Indeed, the events of 
601/600 B.C. reinforce the truth that the Babylonians would have followed the 
Assyrians in trying to enter Egypt through its eastern border, by far the most natural 
invasion route. Lloyd has persuasively argued that this fleet in the Red Sea was
144 Lloyd 1988:150
145 Herodotus 11.158 states that "Necho ceased from the work, being swayed by a 
prophetic utterance that he was toiling beforehand for the barbarian". 
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147 Lloyd 1988:161
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linked to a desire to resume trade with Punt, protecting ships from any pirate activity 
that might have threatened this trade. 148
Another aspect of this interest in maritime affairs is shown by the fragmentary 
inscription from Elephantine from the reign of Necho II, published by Junge. 149 It 
consists of a list of ships, and appears to indicate that under Necho there was a 
military campaign into Nubia. Although little else can be extrapolated from the 
meagre fragment of the stela that we possess, this again shows not only the 
importance of naval policy to the Egyptians, but also re-emphasises the expansionist 
nature of this king.
It also, of course, raises the question of an Egyptian presence in Nubia, and the 
evidence from the Saite fort at Dorginarti suggests that it was occupied throughout the 
Sake period (starting during the reign of Psammetichus I), 150 in turn implying a 
considerable measure of control of the area. It seems likely, therefore, that this 
campaign during the reign of Necho II would have been a "reaction either to nomadic 
infiltration into Lower Nubia or to aggression from Upper Nubia". 151
An interest in the lands to the south of Egypt, was matched by an interest in 
cultivating relationships with the Greek states to the north. We know, for example, 
that "une serie de fragments de faience portent le nom du pharaon Nechao II...etaient 
primitivement incrustes dans un objet en bois dedie par le pharaon a Athena 
lalysia" 152 at lalysos on Rhodes. Herodotus also writes that Necho II "sent to 
Branchidae of Miletus and dedicated there to Apollo the garments in which he won
148 Lloyd 1977:148
149 Junge 1987:66-67 (+ plate 40.c) 
150 Heidorn 1991:205
151 Lloyd 2000:85
152 Leclant 1979:406
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the victories". 153 The political value in making overtures to the Greeks is self-evident, 
and "Necho's dedication in the major Milesian shrine can only reflect the role played 
by Ionian mercenaries in the victories of Magdolos and Kadytis" 154 while 
"Branchidae...was a pan-Ionian and pan-Aeolic oracular shrine famed throughout the 
Greek world...It was, therefore, ideally suited for public-relations gestures such as 
that of Necho". 155 Necho II shrewdly attempted to involve the Greeks in the wider 
world of which they were now a part.
The reign of Necho II then, often portrayed as a failure in matters of foreign 
policy, 156 is one which saw Egypt, for a time at least, control the Levant and have the 
capacity to operate much further east, as well as to the south of the country. 
Moreover, an invasion by the great power of the day, Babylon, was repulsed. 
Furthermore, Egypt incorporated itself deeper into the Mediterranean scene by 
cultivating relationships with states to the north, something that would be built upon 
by subsequent rulers. Necho II's outlook has been aptly summarised by Lloyd - "an 
essentially defensive strategy in the Levant, however aggressive its manifestations, a 
keen eye to any commercial advantages that might accrue from such a policy, and an 
acquisitive attitude" towards the South. 157
If Herodotus' brief mention of Necho II managed to cram enticing information 
into a relatively small amount of text, that is even more so the case when it comes to 
Psammetichus II. The relevant passage for our purposes simply reads "Psammis 
reigned over Egypt for six years only; he invaded Ethiopia, and immediately
153 Herodotus 11.159, the victories mentioned are those at Magdolus and Cadytis.
154 Lloyd 1988:163 
155 ibid.:163
156 E.g. "When Necho died in the summer of 594, a promising and somewhat 
imaginative life had apparently ended in failure." Redford 2000:193
157 Lloyd 1988:149
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thereafter died". 158 Luckily, given the bare-boned nature of the statement, this 
campaign to Nubia is one for which we do not have to rely only upon Herodotus. 
Indeed, several stelae relating this event have been recovered from Egypt, namely the 
Shellal, Karnak and Tanis stelae of Psammetichus II. 159 It should be pointed out that 
the very fact that several copies are extant to us suggests that great stock was laid by 
Psammetichus II on this campaign.
As the Shellal stela contains the complete version of the text, it seems best to 
start by examining that particular version. The text begins with Psammetichus II 
being brought a message that "The army (6) which Your Majesty sent to Nubia has 
reached the country of Pnubs" (ms' (6) sb.n hm=k r Ts-Sttph=sn hsst Pr-nbs),m a 
"turning-point before some...change of mood...on the part of the Pharaoh to 
profound concern...a transition from peace to war". 161 A battle, where it is not 
entirely clear if the king is present or not, ensues, with unhappy results for the 
Kushites since "one waded in their blood like water" (dj=tw m tnv=sn mi mv) 162 and 
4200 prisoners were taken. 163
It should be noted that the Egyptians are the aggressors in this action rather 
than reacting to Kushite military overtures, with the first mention of military motive 
in the inscription being the notification that the army has reached Pnubs (vide supra) 
where trouble subsequently flared. In fact, the stela seems to stress that the Nubians 
did not attempt to put up much of a fight: "it was without an arrow hitting them, or 
them shooting, that the rebels turned their backs" (di hskw-ib S3=sn nn hwdw' 'hsw
158 Herodotus II. 161
159 These three stelae although initially published separately, are brought together in 
Der Manuelian 1994, pp.337-350 for the Shellal stela, pp.351-355 for the Karnak 
fragment and pp.365-371 for the Tanis stela.
160 Translation and transliteration following Der Manuelian 1994:339
161 Bakry 1967:236
162 Der Manuelian 1994:340
163 ibid.:340
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r=sn r stf). 164 This suggests that we should rule out the purpose of this campaign as 
being to prevent a renewed attempt by the Kushites to rule Egypt, since although we 
know so little concerning Nubia during this period, Necho II's Elephantine inscription 
makes it seem unlikely that this was the first Twenty-sixth Dynasty excursion south. 
Therefore, maybe some kind of rebellion is to be envisaged. Furthermore, although 
some have claimed that Psammetichus II "made no effort to annex any Nubian 
territory; the Egyptian boundary at Elephantine remained fixed, as did the no-man's 
land of the Dodecaschoenos...between Egypt and Kush", 165 the evidence from 
Dorginarti suggests the area was under Egyptian control and had been for some 
time, 166 and the troops appear to have reached at least as far as the third cataract 
during the course of the campaign. 167
However, the Tanis stela records a slightly different series of events, with its 
statement that the Nubians "are planning to fight with [you...]" 168 (although this is "a 
standard, indeed, banal, casus belli" 169) and the apparent killing of a Kushite king. 170 
Nevertheless, although we have very little evidence for any movement by the 
Kushites at this time with respect to Egypt, this campaign must still go down as 
having "une signification politique et une ampleur geographique...considerables", 171 
and the possibility of "an economic interest in this area is not to be ignored". 172 Light 
on this episode is shed further by the Greek inscription from Abu Simbel, written by 
soldiers returning - "those who sailed with Psammetichos son of Theokles wrote this;
164 My own translation, largely following Der Manuelian 1994:340, and Der
Manuelian 1994:347-348
165 Spalingerl982b:1171
166 Heidorn 1991:205-206
167 Sauneron & Yoyotte 1952b: 168-169
168 Der Manuelian 1994:367 
169 Spalingerl978a:23
170 Der Manuelian 1994:367
171 Yoyotte 1951:239
172 Lloyd 1988:167
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and they came above Kerkis as far as the river allowed; and Potasimto had command 
of those of foreign speech, and Amasis of the Egyptians". 173
For such a short reign as that of this king, it is perhaps surprising that we also 
have a sliver of evidence for another foreign campaign, albeit one of disputed nature. 
Papyrus Rylands IX 174 contains a mention of Psammetichus II in regnal year four 
asking for priests to accompany him on a trip to Hr, apparently referring to 
Palestine. 175 Lloyd's statement that this "looks more like a triumphal progress than a 
military campaign" 176 is a common view amongst many historians, that this campaign 
of "Psammetique II ne serait ainsi qu'une des differentes manifestations par lesquelles 
ce roi aura chercher a tirer parti de 1'effet moral produit par son triomphe africain". 177
However, it would seem to me that the need for priests would be felt also on a 
campaign of a more military nature. More to the point, since we have little evidence 
between the battle of Carchemish and this excursion to Palestine we either have to 
posit that an unknown campaign put the Levant back into Egyptian control to such an 
extent that free passage was guaranteed (in contrast to 609 B.C., when Egypt, already 
a presence in the east, was blocked), or that this event in itself played a key role in 
Egypt re-integrating itself into Levantine politics.
Ultimately, it must be accepted that if we have no evidence of conflict taking 
place (and it should be remembered that there would be no reason for such conflict to 
be mentioned in Rylands IX), a military presence would have surely been a vital part 
of any Egyptian incursion to Palestine. I do accept, however, that broadcasting 
Psammetichus II's successful vanquishing of the Nubians "aura sans doute contribue
173 Meiggs& Lewis 1988:13
174 Initially published by Griffith 1909, more recently in Vittmann 1998a
175 See Vittmann 1998a:67 for a standardized hieroglyphic version of this passage (14, 
17), p. 162 for the transliteration and p. 163 for the translation.
176 Lloyd 1988:167
177 Sauneron & Yoyotte 1951:144
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a fortifier la position de 1'Egypte dans les relations internationales", 178 reminding 
these people of the might of a once-and-now-again great Egypt, and ensuring that 
Psammetichus II himself would be remembered as "le dieu parfait qui frappe 
l'Asie...lesNubiens". 179
From the end of the reign of Psammetichus I to that of his like-named 
successor, Egypt's fortunes may have oscillated somewhat in the Levant and further, 
but they were certainly re-established as a major power, and too often this success is 
forgotten. It was the expansion during this period that allowed for the greater 
involvement in the Greek world that came with the reigns of Apries and Amasis, 
although that was to ultimately lead to Egypt's downfall in the shape of the Persian 
invasion.
178 Sauneron & Yoyotte 1951:140
179 An inscription taken from a sphinx, published in Sauneron & Yoyotte 1952b:196
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Chapter Three: "Apries being thus deposed, Amasis became king" 180
After the short but eventful reign of Psammetichus II, Apries came to the 
throne. That his foreign adventures are known only from a limited number of sources 
creates a number of uncertainties, although it is true that this is hardly out of the 
ordinary for much of the rest of the Saite period. It should also be pointed out that the 
civil war that ended his reign, as the usurper Amasis came to the throne, has often 
been interpreted with an emphasis on a reaction to the foreign presence in Egypt; a 
result of the foreign policies of Apries and his predecessors.
As for Amasis, we are largely indebted to Herodotus, although his portrayal as 
a lover of the Greeks is reinforced by some archaeological material from outside 
Egypt's borders. He seems to have followed a policy of wide-spread diplomacy, no 
doubt at least partly in recognition of the growing Persian threat from the East, 
although it was ultimately unsuccessful since the brief reign of his successor 
Psammetichus III was ended in 525 B.C. by an invasion of Egypt by the Persians.
However, this eventual fate could hardly have been predicted when Apries 
came to the throne. The threat from the East was not the Persians but the 
Babylonians, who had a commercial and military interest in the Levant. In this 
context, the siege and sacking of Jerusalem by the Babylonians seems a particularly 
momentous incident, no doubt as much because of our reliance on partisan biblical 
sources as Judah's inherent strategical importance, and a story in which the Egyptians 
play a minor, but vital, supporting role. Using Malamat's chronology, 181 it seems that 
an Egyptian force attempted to relieve the siege in the spring of 587 B.C. This date, 
in the early years of the new pharaoh's reign, suggests that this act was a show of
180 Herodotus II. 172
181 Malamat 1968:151-152
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strength, to prevent any doubts about the might of Egypt on the part of Levantine 
kings, although it was more important to also show the Babylonians that Egypt could 
not be easily dominated.
On the other hand, one prophetic passage that has been taken as referring to 
this event emphasises the small size of the Egyptian force: following an appeal for 
help from Jerusalem, the response from Egypt is given this description; "And with no 
great force or large assemblage will Pharaoh deal with him in battle, when ramps are 
thrown up and a siege-wall built for cutting down many lives". 182 If the Egyptian 
troops were a particularly small group, it seems unlikely to have been very successful 
as a show of strength.
However, the extent to which we can take this passage at face value is 
debatable. Firstly, it has been suggested that this particular phrase is a later addition 
to a passage that otherwise belongs to a time before the siege of Jerusalem. 183 
Secondly, since one of the running themes throughout almost all the utterances by 
prophets on the subject is to portray Egypt as a 'broken reed' (i.e. an unreliable and 
indeed damaging source of support); and this is exactly what this passage attempts to 
do, it may prove to be an example of an impassioned Ezekiel bending the truth to 
serve his didactic purpose. Thirdly, another piece of biblical evidence - "The army of 
the Pharaoh had come out of Egypt; and when the Chaldeans who were besieging 
Jerusalem heard news of them, they withdrew from Jerusalem"184 - indicates that the 
force was sizeable enough for reports of it to alert the Babylonians sufficiently to 
cause at least a temporary retreat.
182 Ezekiel 17:17 (my italics)
183 Greenberg 1983:323
184 Jeremiah 37:5
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Herodotus neglects to include mention of this incident, if he knew of it, and 
neither do we have any Egyptian evidence that can be brought to bear. Relying on 
this biblical evidence, what reasons might there have been for Apries to follow this 
course of action? It is probably true that Apries had no particular interest in seeing 
Jerusalem remain independent for its own sake, especially as under Psammetichus II, 
Egypt seems to have at the very least enjoyed the freedom to campaign in the region 
(vide supra). Had the relief action proved ultimately successful, presumably Apries 
would have expected hegemony over Judah, and Jeremiah 47:1 - "This came to the 
Prophet Jeremiah as the word of the LORD concerning the Philistines before 
Pharaoh's harrying of Gaza" - could be interpreted as indicative of an Egyptian 
campaign to take Gaza. Following the Assyrian encounter with Egypt, it is obvious to 
see why an Egyptian pharaoh would have been wary of a Western Asian power 
coming closer and closer to Egypt's eastern border and sphere of influence; 
eliminating any buffer zone that might have existed.
This intended aggression against the Babylonians might have been the reason 
behind the posited Babylonian invasion of Egypt in 582 B.C., although whether or not 
this invasion actually took place is open to debate. Much of the evidence we have is 
of a questionable nature, and mainly consists of a variety of prophetic statements in 
the Old Testament. The Babylonian Chronicle is unknown for this time period, and 
contemporary Egyptian evidence for this event is non-existent.
Examining the biblical evidence, one related passage is when Jeremiah says 
that "Nebuchadrezzar...shall come and smite the land of Egypt" 185 after his act of 
burying some stones in an official building in 'Tahpanhes' (Defenneh/Daphnae), and 
also when Jeremiah states that "I will give Pharaoh Hophra king of Egypt into the
185 Jeremiah 43:1 Off.
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hand of those who seek his life". 186 There is also a poem warning Egypt of her 
impending doom consisting of "The word which the LORD spoke to the prophet 
Jeremiah when Nebuchadrezzar king of Babylon was corning to harry the land of 
Egypt". The first statement, dated only to a time after the capture of Jerusalem, 
could be taken as referring to Nebuchadrezzar's thirty-seventh year (vide infra), as 
indeed could the second (similarly 'dated') and the third (completely undated). 
Although Jeremiah himself had stopped prophesying by Nebuchadrezzar's thirty- 
seventh year, a tradition of editing did continue for some time after his death, no 
doubt emphasising Jeremiah's main purpose as a prophet who "creates and presides 
over the annihilation of the enemy (e.g. Judah, Egypt, Babylon)". 188 It is difficult 
therefore to use the book of Jeremiah as convincing evidence of a Babylonian 
invasion of Egypt in 582 B.C.
The remaining biblical evidence takes the shape of Ezekiel 29-30. Ezekiel 29,
1 RQthe first half of which is dated to 7 January 587, has Yahweh warning that he "will 
turn the land of Egypt into ruins of parched desolation from Migdol to Syene, to the 
border of Cush" 190 for 40 years. Clearly, the date suggests that Ezekiel assumed that 
the Babylonians would move onto Egypt once they had taken Jerusalem, and 
therefore he forecast a terrible fate for Egypt; to use this to suggest a Babylonian 
invasion actually took place is suspect. The second half of Ezekiel 29 is dated 
substantially later, 191 but is of a similar character, Yahweh informing Ezekiel that he 
is "giving the land of Egypt to Nebuchadrezzar king of Babylon". 192
186 Jeremiah 44:30
187 Jeremiah 46:13
188 Carroll 1986:727
189 Bright 1986:601
190 Ezekiel 29:10
191 571 BC - Spalinger 1977:236
192 Ezekiel 29:19
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Ezekiel 30:1-19 is again of a similar character while 30:20-26, dated to 29 
April 587, once more has Yahweh promising that he will "put my sword into the 
hand of the king of Babylon... against the land of Egypt". 194 This is clearly dated to a 
time when the Egyptian relief force had retreated, for Yahweh initially states that "I 
have broken the arm of Pharaoh". 195 This particular passage can thus be seen again as 
part of Ezekiel's reaction to the siege of Jerusalem, rather than a comment on a later 
invasion of Egypt.
More evidence comes from the Jewish historian Josephus, who is quite 
unambiguous in his account - "on the fifth year after the destruction of Jerusalem, 
which was the twenty-third of the reign of Nebuchadnezzar... he fell upon Egypt, in 
order to overthrow it; and he slew the king that then reigned, and set up another". 196 
There are immediately apparent problems with this statement. It is accepted that 
Apries ruled until 570 B.C. and survived a few years longer; he was certainly not 
killed by Nebuchadnezzar. Indeed, Egyptian evidence which we shall examine later 
suggests that Nebuchadnezzar and Apries eventually combined forces in an attempt to 
depose Amasis.
Although it is not inconceivable that Josephus could have got this one detail 
wrong but the essential account of an invasion correct, quite what access he might 
have had to extra-biblical sources is questionable. Since there is no Egyptian 
archaeological evidence of an invasion at this time and in light of the fact that 
Josephus was writing 600 years after the events he purports to describe, and with the 
highly partisan writing of Old Testament prophets another testimonial of this 
supposed invasion of 582, it seems best to proceed on the basis that it did not take
193 Bright 1986:631
194 Ezekiel 30:25
195 Ezekiel 30:21
196 Josephus, AJX, 9, 7.
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place. On the other hand, a selection of later Egyptian texts do seem to preserve a 
tradition of a Babylonian invasion of Egypt during the reign of Apries, 197 and since 
the historical record for the Saite period is nowhere near being complete, an invasion 
cannot be ruled out conclusively.
Herodotus does not mention this invasion, but he does state that Apries "sent 
an army against Sidon and did battle by sea with the king of Tyre". 198 This is 
supplemented by a more in-depth account from Diodorus Siculus. 199 He emphasises 
that substantial forces were used, that the rest of Phoenicia and also Cyprus, which 
would have provided a key strategic base, were defeated, and that this took place 
shortly before the infamous campaign to Cyrene (vide infra). The taking of Cyprus 
particularly would have provided the Egyptians with a strong hold over the trade 
routes up and down the Levantine coast, including those of copper and also of the 
timber needed for a navy growing in importance. 200
Lloyd201 has suggested that the difference between the two accounts implies 
that Diodorus Siculus had access to independent sources, and it is true that there is 
nothing in his account to arouse much scepticism. Lloyd also indicates that the period 
574-570 B.C. would have been the most likely for such activities on the part of 
Apries,202 for a variety of reasons, not least because if Ezekiel and Josephus are 
correct in their description of a thirteen year siege by the Babylonians of Tyre starting 
in 587/6 B.C.,203 Egypt and Tyre would presumably have had good relations during 
this period.
197 As mentioned in Spalinger 1977:238-240
198 Herodotus II. 161
199 Diodorus Siculus I, 68, 1.
200 Lloyd 2000:89
201 Lloyd 1988:171
202 ibid.: 170-172
203 Ezekiel 26ff. and Josephus, Ap, I, 21.
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If we are to take Diodorus Siculus as correct, then the picture in the Levant 
towards the end of the reign of Apries would have been much rosier than after the 
Babylonian siege of Jerusalem, and Apries should perhaps be viewed as having 
possessed a more expansive agenda. An Egyptian foothold in the Levant would have 
been provided by Phoenician conquests which would also have fortified the Egyptian 
trading network.
As has been mentioned previously, however, these successful campaigns were 
followed by an attack on Cyrene that ultimately led to Apries being deposed. Again, 
Herodotus is our main source, relating that "Apries sent a great host against Cyrene 
and suffered a great defeat". 204 Herodotus also records that the Egyptian machimoi 
rebelled after this defeat for "they thought that Apries had knowingly sent his men to 
their doom, that by their so perishing he might be the safer in his rule over the rest of 
the Egyptians". 205
Why would Apries have sent troops to Cyrene in the first place? Perhaps 
having secured his eastern frontier and expanded Egypt's influence in that direction 
after the campaigns recorded by Diodorus Siculus, Apries felt that it would be easier 
to follow a similar program to the west, rather than push on further eastwards. The 
campaign has often been seen as a response to Libyans feeling the pressure from 
Cyrenaic expansion asking the Egyptians for aid;206 the Egyptians only too happy to 
help because of both the Libyan background of much of the machimoi and, more 
importantly, the fact that Cyrene would have provided yet another economic boost (in
204 Herodotus II. 161
205 Herodotus II. 161
206 Chamoux 1953:135
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which case the campaign would have fitted in perfectly with the importance given to 
trade shown by Apries in targeting the Phoenician coast).207
However, it appears that this campaign was much more unsuccessful than 
those east, as evidenced by Diodorus Siculus' claim of Apries, that "il envoya une 
force considerable...mais la plus grande partie de ces troupes ayant peri, les 
survivants se tournerent centre lui",208 although it must be remembered that he may 
here be doing no more than elaborating on Herodotus.
This rebellion will be dealt with infra, but it would be instructive at this point 
to briefly mention a rebellion by foreign troops at Elephantine which took place 
during the reign of Apries. It is known from a statue of Neshor, who served under 
Necho II, Psammetichus II and Apries, and who took titles including "prepose a la 
porte des pays etrangers meridionaux",209 published by Schafer.210 We know little of 
this revolt, but it is probably better seen as a local, small-scale issue arising from 
mercenary forces rather than anything to do with the native Egyptians.
Although the coup d'etat perpetrated by Amasis is strictly speaking a matter of 
domestic interest, as shall be seen it is integral not only to an understanding of 
Egypt's foreign relations towards the end of the Saite period, but also to 
understanding how these relations have been perceived by historians, from Herodotus 
onwards.
One Egyptian source that refers explicitly to this period is the intriguing 
double dated Elephantine stela of Amasis. Originally published by Daressy it has
207 The possible motives for the attack are discussed in Lloyd 1988:173-4
208 Diodorus Siculus, I, 68, 2 as translated in Chamoux, Bertram & Verniere 1993
209 de Meulenaere 1966:14
210 Schafer 1904:155ff. 
211 Leahyl988:198
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since been discussed by Edel and Leahy.212 Originally thought to have been dated to 
year three of Amasis, Edel has shown that it is in fact two sections dated separately, 
year one and year four.213 The year one section begins with Amasis as king, and 
Apries, accompanied by Greeks, moving against him. These forces are defeated, 
although no mention is made of exactly what happened to Apries. The second 
section, dated three years later, sees the defeat of an attempted Asiatic invasion of 
Egypt, and Apries, who appears to have been in league with these Asiatics, is buried 
honourably by Amasis. The double-date in itself suggests that this is at least partially 
an attempt to rewrite history to serve the ends of the new pharaoh, but what other 
evidence do we have backing this assertion up?
Intriguingly, Leahy has shown how our last known reference to Apries as king 
(from Thebes, importantly) is several months later than our earliest known reference 
to Amasis as king (donation stela BM 952, from Sharuna) - this suggests not a co- 
regency but a period whereby each individual had different power bases within Egypt. 
That the Apries reference is from Thebes goes against the relatively lengthy and in- 
depth account of Herodotus of this period and also the aforementioned Elephantine 
stela, in which Apries' reliance on mercenary Greek support in the Delta is 
emphasised.214
Diodorus Siculus also explicitly mentions Apries' mercenary support,215 
although since his only departure from Herodotus is the manner of Apries' death, it is 
debatable to what extent he functions as an independent source. Our final (partial)
212 Edel 1978, Leahy 1988
213 Edel 1978:13, the year one date had previously been suggested by Posener 
1945:129
214 E.g. in 11.163 Apries' force is described as "a bodyguard of Carians and lonians" 
while 11.169 sees the assertion that Amasis enjoyed "the whole force of the 
Egyptians".
215 Diodorus Siculus I, 68, 4
54
account of the intrigue between Apries and Amasis is a Babylonian tablet, BM 
33041, recording an attack on Egypt in year thirty-seven of Nebuchadnezzar 
(corresponding to year 4 of Amasis). On what survives of the tablet, the outcome of 
the attempted invasion is unknown, and there is no mention of Apries.
The picture created by these disparate sources is an intriguing one, and 
ultimately the exact course of these events cannot be surmised. On the one hand, we 
have Herodotus, Diodorus Siculus and Amasis himself painting a picture whereby the 
usurper was little more than the lucky recipient of a groundswell of native Egyptian ill 
will against Apries and his apparent over-reliance on mercenary Greek support. 
Further, Amasis was in fact inclined to treat Apries honourably after his usurpation, in 
what is largely an overwhelmingly positive treatment of his character. Allied to this 
is the Babylonian evidence confirming the attempted invasion of year 4 of Amasis, 
during which, the Elephantine stela tells us, Apries died (differing from Herodotus 
and Diodorus Siculus on this point).
On the other hand, we have two documents of an administrative nature 
confirming that in the Egyptian heartland Apries was considered king while Amasis 
was also claiming the title. Would this have happened if the Egyptian/Greek 
separation was as clear-cut as the other sources suggest? It seems unlikely. In which 
case, how is this to be explained? As Leahy plausibly suggests, it seems probable that 
Amasis, conscious of his position as a usurper, mounted this stela for propaganda 
purposes,217 and if this was the case, one would think it would be merely one facet of 
a multi-pronged attack. As such, Herodotus and Diodorus, who apparently 
independently confirm Amasis' version of events, may rather merely confirm the 
success of his propaganda.
216 Re-published in Wiseman 1956, translated Pritchard 1969:308.
217 Leahy 1988:190
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Our main source for the rest of Amasis' reign is Herodotus, though much of 
his account is occupied with excursuses which are of little interest for our purposes, 
although it should be pointed out that the tradition of Amasis as a lawgiver, preserved 
by Herodotus, 18 is probably a result of an attempt to at least partially re-organise the 
country's administration in the wake of his usurpation.219
One of these actions that would have affected foreign relations that Herodotus 
does mention is Amasis' act of giving to Greeks "who came to Egypt the city of 
Naucratis to dwell in".220 This does not refer to a founding of the city (at least, the 
city was founded earlier, though Herodotus may have not known this) but rather to a 
concentration of the Greek presence in Egypt. Although Herodotus portrays this as a 
result of Amasis' love for all things Greek, Lloyd221 suggests that it is more likely to 
have come from a quite opposite kind of feeling; certainly it was a restrictive move - 
although it need not have been an expression of anti-Greek sentiment. A usurper who 
was, to some extent at least, shoring up the organisation and administration of his 
country to secure his power base, would have been well-served in restricting Greek 
presence to an easily observed and controlled location not far from Sais. It is perhaps 
in this light that the moving of Greek soldiers from their camp in the eastern Delta to 
Memphis to be his 'bodyguard' is to be seen.222
The final paragraphs of Herodotus Book II discuss Amasis' diplomatic 
relations with a number of Greek states. Firstly, Amasis is presented as contributing 
towards the rebuilding of the temple at Delphi, giving a thousand talents' weight of
218 Herodotus II. 177
219 See Posener 1945 for a discussion of commercial re-organisation at the start of
Amasis' reign.
220 Herodotus II. 178
221 Lloyd 1988:221
222 Herodotus II. 154
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alum to the Delphians,223 presumably to be sold on by the Greeks.224 Although it is 
indeed possible that this was purely an exercise in compassion, motivated by Amasis' 
love of the Greeks mentioned by Herodotus,225 it is far more likely that Amasis acted 
in self-interest, attempting to cultivate a relationship with Delphi for both trade and 
military purposes. It hardly needs saying that at this time, Persia was becoming a 
force on the world stage, precipitating the need for dependable military support.
Furthermore, Amasis also appears to have used diplomatic means to secure a 
peaceful relationship with Cyrene, the state that had caused so many problems for 
Apries. Indeed, Cyrene aided him in repelling the Babylonian threat early on in his 
reign,226 suggesting an alliance that also, if Herodotus is to be believed,227 led to 
Amasis taking a wife called Ladice, from Cyrene. Peace on the western front would 
have been a valuable fillip for Amasis, preventing him from having to worry about an 
attack from the east and the west.
Herodotus also maintains that Amasis made offerings to Hera in Samos as 
well, as a result of his friendship with Polycrates, the tyrant ruler of Samos.228 Again, 
gifts are an indicator of a political alliance. Indeed, Herodotus provides a longer 
version of the gestation of this alliance in Book III, ending with Amasis renouncing it 
since he believed a great misfortune was about to fall on Polycrates, who promptly 
sent troops to aid Cambyses' invasion of Egypt.229 It would seem likely that the folk- 
story qualities of this narrative are evidence that it is a construction to disguise the
223 Herodotus II. 180
224 Parke & Wormell 1961:144
225 Herodotus II. 178 
226 Edell978:15-16
227 Herodotus 11.181
228 Herodotus II. 182
229 Herodotus 111.39-46
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fact that Polycrates joined the Persians of his own volition.230 If the attempt to build 
an alliance to combat the Persians was unsuccessful, it was nevertheless the right 
strategy to follow.
Herodotus also states that Amasis' gifts to Athene of Lindus were not 
politically motivated, saying that it was because "it is said that the temple of Athene 
in Lindus was founded by the daughters of Danaus, when they landed there in their 
flight from the sons of Egyptus",231 but one is inclined to disagree. Indeed, 
archaeological evidence has suggested that there was a close relationship between 
Rhodes and Egypt at this time,232 no doubt at least partially motivated again by 
military threat and commercial benefit.
Herodotus also briefly states that Amasis "was the first conqueror of Cyprus, 
which he made tributary to himself'.233 Although he was not in fact the first 
conqueror of Cyprus, that Herodotus thought so perhaps suggests a high level of 
control of the area by Amasis. These overtures to the north may have been 
symptomatic of a development in the importance of the Egyptian navy; as suggested 
by the number of naval officers known to us from the later part of the Saite period.234
Unfortunately, this greater emphasis on maritime connections with the Greek 
states to the north of the country did not prove enough to prevent a Persian invasion. 
After the death of Amasis and the accession of Psammetichus HI, the Persians 
marched against Egypt in 525 B.C., aided by the defection of a mercenary commander
'J'lC
by the name of Phanes, if Herodotus is to be believed. So ended the Saite
230 Mitchell 1975:79 
23 'Herodotus II. 182
232 See Francis & Vickers 1984:69
233 Herodotus II. 182
234 Spalinger 1977:235-236 for a brief summary, and Lloyd 2000 for a fuller 
discussion of the importance of the navy throughout the Saite period.
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renaissance, curtailed by a Western Asian power and the changeable nature of 
mercenary support, although it was indeed the actions of a Western Asian power and 
mercenary support which had helped install Psammetichus I on the throne.
Apries has often been seen as a failure upon the international stage, but it has 
been shown that this is perhaps an unfair reading affected by the nature of the sources 
that treat the subject. Amasis, too, was relatively successful, and indeed Herodotus' 
glowing portrayal has been key in Amasis being remembered as a success - especially 
since Egypt was not invaded under his watch, although it is debateable whether or not 
he could have stopped the Persians had he survived longer. Ultimately, the reigns of 
Apries and Amasis saw the interest in safeguarding trading interests and furthering 
contacts with the wider international world that is the hallmark of Egypt's foreign 
relations during the Saite period.
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Conclusion
After a century and a quarter of rule of Egypt, the Saite period came to an 
ignominious end under the stewardship of Psammetichus III, when the Persians 
invaded Egypt in 525 B.C. During previous chapters I have attempted to analyse the 
actions of these Saite rulers with regard to foreign relations, aiming to show that 
although the underlying thought behind many of their actions was a concern for 
Egypt's defence, foreign relations during the Saite period were nevertheless far more 
successful than is suggested by the fact that invasion by the Persians was the final 
action.
The Twenty-sixth Dynasty arose from the political situation created by the 
foreign dealings of the Kushite Twenty-fifth Dynasty. The pragmatic approach taken 
by the Kushites, oscillating between subservience and antagonism towards the 
Assyrians, had unfortunately not succeeded in preventing a succession of attempted 
invasions by the Assyrians. However, before declaring their rule of Egypt an 
unmitigated failure it must be pointed out that our main chroniclers of this period, the 
Assyrians, no doubt colour our view of the time in their favour, and also that the 
Kushites had little reason to expect in the first place that the Assyrians would actually 
attempt to invade Egypt.
With Egypt invaded by the Assyrians, an attempted rebellion by the native 
Egyptian chiefs and princes was uncovered, and the perpetrators were killed, except 
for a Nile Delta leader, Necho I, and his son, the future Psammetichus I. These two 
were taken to Nineveh and entered into a treaty with the Assyrians, Psammetichus I 
even being given an Assyrian name. It appears to me that this act heralded a change 
in policy. Initially, the Assyrians had tried to control Egypt themselves, stationing
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troops to uphold the status quo. This could only ever be a short-term measure due to 
the prolific campaigning of the Assyrian empire and, besides, it is unlikely that the 
Assyrians wanted to include Egypt in their empire; they merely wanted their own 
interests in the Levant to be free from Egyptian meddling. A sympathetic Egyptian 
leader, such as Necho I, who now owed his very life to the Assyrians could, if he 
controlled the Nile Delta, at least guarantee Assyria free rein in the Levant.
There would have been clear benefits for both sides if this arrangement had 
been given the chance to last; for Necho I, the execution of his rivals by the Assyrians 
would have allowed him to expand his power base in the Delta, while the Assyrians 
would have benefited from the aforementioned security in the Levant, and greater 
availability of their troops. Unfortunately, the arrangement was not given the chance 
to flourish since, although his death is not explicitly recorded, it appears that Necho I 
died resisting an attack by the Nubian king Tanutamani which aimed to remove the 
Assyrians from Egypt for once and for all.
It seems likely that at this time, possibly fearing for his own life, having seen 
his father killed, Psammetichus I fled the country, almost certainly for safety provided 
by the Assyrians, be it in the Levant or Nineveh. It seems more than likely that he 
returned with the Assyrians in the punitive campaign of 664 B.C. that led to the 
sacking of Thebes. Once he was back in Egypt, Psammetichus I quickly gained 
overall control of the Delta, perhaps indirectly benefiting from the Assyrian 
emasculation of native Egyptian dynasts, although I feel it is very unlikely he would 
have had any access to Assyrian troops. In 656 B.C., the Nitocris Adoption Stela 
commemorated the effective subjugation of the Theban nobility and as such the 
unification of Egypt.
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Although it is not certain at which point in this train of events Psammetichus I, 
who may very well have established contact with other vassal leaders at Nineveh,236 
sought foreign help, he certainly did so, gaining mercenaries possibly from Gyges of 
Lydia in return for a promise to attack the Assyrians. Clearly, a united Egypt led by 
an Egyptian would not be able to expand or function properly with Assyrian troops in 
the vicinity and they were promptly expelled. Although this process is often seen as 
separate from the growth of the power of Psammetichus I, I think the two should be 
seen as having taken place hand in hand, with it being difficult to contemplate how 
Psammetichus I would have garnered enough local troops to take over the Delta, 
unless the Assyrians played a larger helping role than seems likely.
The settling of these foreign mercenaries in camps in the Delta would have 
increased the king's control of Egypt, ensuring that they could both be usefully 
controlled by the king, and could themselves be used as an instrument to control the 
local population. They could serve a useful purpose in the short-term in discouraging 
any possible rebellions, and also provide a long-term power base.
Once his control was established, one of the first acts of foreign policy of the 
new king that we know of was to conscript troops to quell some sort of disturbance on 
the Libyan border, in 654 B.C. It appears likely that although there may well have 
been a threat, the Libyans attempting to take advantage of the relative uncertainty of 
the reign of a new king, the episode was shrewdly exploited by Psammetichus I. He 
did this through exerting his control over the whole of the country by levying troops 
from every nome. As well as obviously providing a force to be used, the bringing 
together of different nomes may have gone someway to recreating the concept of a 
united Egypt with the country's citizens. Either way, it is likely that the threat was
236 Bresciani 1990:247
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successfully neutralized since we hear of no more trouble on Egypt's western border 
till the reign of Apries. Certainly, the setting up of stelae commemorating this action 
would have had a beneficial effect on morale, reinforcing the idea that the prestige of 
Egypt was on an upward curve. At the end of this initial period of his reign, 
Psammetichus I and his country were secure domestically, although little action had 
been taken outside Egypt's borders.
There is little evidence pertaining to domestic or foreign affairs during the 
middle years of the reign of Psammetichus I, perhaps due to an accident of 
preservation and the fact that "it seems to no longer matter whether the mighty acts of 
the king are prominently displayed for public consumption".237 This is particularly 
frustrating as no doubt this period would have been a time of great change, 
Psammetichus I being "intent upon uplifting Egypt's fallen condition".238 
Psammetichus was a relatively newly-installed king when he had to deal with stirrings 
in Libya, a relatively local problem, yet his kingship was presumably of a completely 
different nature nearly half a century later when we can at last again securely date his 
actions.
Nevertheless, it appears that it was during this unknown middle time period 
that Psammetichus I besieged the Philistine city of Ashdod. This town was of great 
strategic importance, and securing its allegiance would have provided the Egyptians 
with a key foothold into the vibrant commerciality of the Levant. It would be 
surprising if the Egyptians had not expanded their control out of Ashdod, perhaps 
filling the void left by the contracting Assyrian empire, and a certain amount of 
control of this area is suggested by the Apis stela of 612 B.C., which seems to indicate 
suzerainty over the Lebanon.
237 Redford 2000:184 
238 Spalingerl978a:35
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This is hardly surprising in context of the actions of 616 B.C., which saw an 
Egyptian force taking part in military action with the Assyrian army near the 
Euphrates. It is likely that they allied themselves with the Assyrians to prevent the 
Babylonians from moving into the Levant; any suggestion that the Assyrians "gave' 
the Egyptians the Levant in return for their support is unfounded, since the available 
evidence suggests that the Egyptians had already moved into a vacuum left by the 
decline of the Assyrian civilization. Over the next few years, the Babylonian 
Chronicle provides us with occasional insights into the presence of the Egyptian army 
in Western Asia. The last mention during the reign of Psammetichus is the 
abandonment of Harran in 610 B.C.
At the death of Psammetichus I a year later, Egypt was firmly ensconced once 
more in its traditional position of strength on the international scene. Necho II was 
forced to be involved in foreign affairs from the very start of his reign by the 
expansive policies of his predecessor, although his presence with the initial force after 
he came to power suggests he himself was keen to initiate further gains in the East. 
Egypt clearly must have had a vested interest in the outcome of these wars in Western 
Asia to remain involved over a considerable number of years.
On their way to Western Asia, the Egyptians, led by Necho, were confronted 
by Josiah, who paid for this bold move with his life. No doubt he felt that the new 
king of the Egyptians, who had recently shown some military weakness at Harran, 
was vulnerable at the start of his reign, but this was not the case. The Egyptian 
control of the area was further heightened by subsequent interference in the 
succession of the kings of Judah, which ensured that the ruler of this kingdom was not 
interested in warmongering against Egypt.
64
In Western Asia, however, Necho II's forces clashed with the Babylonians 
several times, establishing themselves in the area, but they were ultimately worsted in 
a defeat at Carchemish that appears to have been quite comprehensive, although we 
must always take into account the bias of the Babylonian sources that are our only 
testimonial of this activity. Despite the eventual failure of the joint Assyrian- 
Egyptian force, the ability to retake Harran and to take Kimuhu prior to this suggests 
that the Egyptians were vital allies for the Assyrians.
Not a great deal more is known from the reign of Necho II, but in 601 B.C. the 
Egyptian troops proved strong enough to repel an attempted Babylonian invasion on 
the Egyptian border. It may have been that Babylonian movements before the 
attempted invasion were the catalyst for Adon's undated letter asking for help from 
the Egyptian king.239 Despite the pessimistic portrayal of Egypt's position after the 
battle of Carchemish by historians, one cannot rule out the possibility that Egypt 
continued to make its presence felt in the Levant. In fact, the rebuttal of the attack 
mentioned above suggests that Egypt was stronger than it is often given credit for.
Although the Babylonian invasion was repelled by land-based troops, the 
reign of Necho II saw more emphasis placed on Egypt's naval strategy. There 
appears to have been a campaign, involving a substantial fleet of ships, to Nubia 
during his reign. His ships in the Mediterranean provided a useful corollary to any 
possible land troop movements in the Levant, as well as combating any Phoenician 
threat, while the ships stationed in the Red Sea were probably stationed there due to a 
resumption in trade with Punt. Both commercially, and militarily, an Egyptian navy 
could prove to be an important asset, and through gift exchange Necho II sought 
closer contacts with the Greek states to the north. In all then, despite being much-
239 Shea 1976:61-64
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maligned by many historians, Necho II defended Egypt, managed to operate militarily 
a long way from home, and established relations with Greek states.
The reign of his successor, Psammetichus II, was short, but appears to have 
contained two foreign campaigns. The first was southerly, an armed force heading 
into Nubia and apparently subduing the native peoples in a series of battles. It is 
debatable to what extent this campaign was undertaken as a result of a distinct 
military threat, appearing rather to "have taken the form of a pre-emptive strike on a 
grand scale". 240 Unfortunately, the Egyptian testimony of the campaign in a variety 
of stelae is not as clear-cut as one would hope. Similarly, we have little evidence 
from this period from Nubia itself. It is certain however, that Psammetichus II 
exploited this campaign for political reasons in the aforementioned stelae, attempting 
to use a backlash against the expelled Nubian rulers of Egypt to bolster his own 
popularity. One could suggest that this was an attempt to win back the native 
population to the Saite ruling house after the 'unsuccessful' reign of Necho II 
although it is true that the supposedly unsuccessful nature of Necho II's reign has 
been overstated and overplayed somewhat, if not enormously.
The second campaign, into Syria-Palestine, has also been ascribed to 
propaganda motives traditionally, although it seems to me that a desire to parade 
through the Levant would have been impractical for an Egyptian king without a 
sizeable military force, a force that may well have been needed to battle on occasion. 
Letting the rulers of the various cities in the Levant know that Psammetichus II had 
vanquished a traditional foe would not have been without its benefits, certainly, but 
that is not to say that the campaign was 'peaceful' and only mounted for propagandist 
reasons. At the end of the reign of Psammetichus II, the Saite Dynasty had overseen a
240 Lloyd 1988:167
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variety of successes and failures in the Levant, but Egypt's prestige was once more 
considerable.
Psammetichus II was succeeded by Apries. The siege of Jerusalem in 587 
B.C. by the Babylonians, with their commercial and military interest in the Levant, 
saw the Egyptians lose their control of this area, even though an Egyptian relief force, 
probably acting as a show of strength at the start of the reign of Apries, did make the 
Babylonians temporarily retreat. Apries had no inherent interest in seeing Jerusalem 
become independent, except to perhaps act as a buffer zone between Egypt and 
Babylon. Although many historians believe that this event was followed by a 
Babylonian invasion of Egypt in 582 B.C., I find the evidence to be somewhat 
unreliable, and therefore suggest that it did not take place, although an invasion 
cannot be dismissed entirely.
During his reign, Apries appears to have gained dominance over certain key 
strategic bases, such as Cyprus, and also Phoenicia, particularly in the shape of Sidon 
and Tyre. These sites would be not only important to the navy from a military point 
of view, but controlling the sea to a greater extent would have led to greater ease of 
trade. At this point, Egypt's foreign relations looked to be in an overwhelmingly 
positive state. Maybe this prosperity led to the ultimately misguided campaign 
against Cyrene; taking Cyrene would certainly have provided an economic boost, and 
may have pleased the Egyptian machimoi of Libyan extraction.
After defeat against the Cyreneaens, Apries was deposed by his general 
Amasis. Although this coup was subsequently painted as an Egyptian reaction against 
foreign presence in Egypt, and the king's closeness to his foreign troops, the support 
lines appear not to have been so clearly divided between natives and foreigners. In 
his fourth regnal year, Amasis defeated an attempted Babylonian invasion, with the
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aid of troops from Cyrene; the attempted invasion perhaps showing that 
Nebuchadnezzar viewed Egypt under Amasis as a renewed threat. 241 Amasis' 
treatment of the Greeks within Egypt, concentrating them in Naucratis and moving 
the soldiers from their camps to Memphis, suggests that he wanted to shore up their 
support for him.
His relations with the Greeks outside of Egypt performed a similar function, 
attempting to create a network of alliances that would have allowed Egypt to fend off 
the Persian threat. Herodotus states that he cultivated friendships with Delphi, Samos 
and Lindus, and it seems likely he would have courted other Greek states as well. 
Although Apries had mainly been castigated by the historical record it seems to me 
that one mistake has blemished his record, while Amasis has benefited hugely from 
the glowing write-up that Herodotus gives him, no doubt due in part at least to 
Amasis' own propaganda.
Under the reign of Psammetichus III, the Persian threat was not fended off, 
and Egypt was invaded by Cambyses, aided by the defection of Phanes of 
Halicarnassus. No doubt influenced by this final act, Spalinger has written that "the 
Saite monarchy could not operate the kingdom internally or externally without the 
support of foreigners"242 but bar the obvious exception of the Apries and Amasis civil 
war, the Saite period was one that saw Egypt more unified than it had been for several 
centuries, and it seems that this had little to do with the foreign presence in Egypt.
If defence was the main concern underlying foreign relations during this 
period, it must be said that, till the Persians invaded, Saite foreign relations were 
successful in safeguarding the integrity of Egypt as a nation-state. Furthermore, under 
every Pharaoh of the dynasty Egypt appears to have, for a time at least, held sway in
241 Spalinger 1978a: 14
242 ibid.:36
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the Levant, despite the powerful foes it faced in the forms of Assyria, Babylon and 
Persia. Ultimately, the Saite period saw not only a renaissance in domestic terms, but 
also in the sphere of foreign relations.
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